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The state of the global environment is undoubtedly one of the most pressing issues on the 
international agenda.  The last half of the last century witnessed remarkable increase in 
awareness of environmental degradation, especially in Western Europe and North 
America (Munn 1979).  Concerns of environmental movements in these parts of the 
world, especially in the U.S. during the first half of the last century and earlier, focused 
on conservation efforts while environmentalism of the second half of the century was 
mostly concerned with environmental quality (Clark 1990; Powell 1998).  This change in 
environmental concern was prompted by aggressive post World War II (WW II) 
rebuilding efforts and the proliferation of the petrochemical automation industry at the 
end of WW II (Munn 1979).   
 
1.1 Africa’s Environmental Evolution 
Africa showed no substantial environmental concern and little petrochemical 
industrialization efforts during this period.  The continent was engulfed in a set of socio-
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economic and political imbalances that gained momentum in the early 1980s and cast the 
continent in the world’s worst environmental conditions.  When Europe, North America, 
and Japan (the so called Triad) were forging ahead with nation building after WW II, 
most African states were fighting for their independence.  Following their independence 
in the 1960s most African nations have been experiencing social insecurity, political 
instability, economic instability, conflicts and war, poverty and environmental 
degradation.  Experts in environmental sciences, economists and politicians from the 
continent as well as from other parts of the world, point to the following as Africa’s 
prime environmental concerns:  population pressure on resources and growth of urban 
areas, industrialization, water pollution, land degradation and deforestation, protection 
and sustainable forest use, and protection and management of biodiversity (Middleton 
1997; Mol 2001; UNECA 1996). 
 
These environmental concerns cannot be understood fully without an appreciation of both 
human and physical environments.  Africa is a relative new comer to the modern world 
system and understanding the interaction between human activities and the natural 
environment has not been easy for a majority of Africans.  From all indications, the rapid 
increase in human population, along with urbanization, rural poverty and rural-urban 
exodus, developments in socio-political and economic structures and policy-environment, 
have all combined to interact with the continent’s ecosystems, creating most of the 
environmental problems facing Africa today.  Although most of Africa’s environmental 
problems have been blamed on poverty, ineffective economic and environmental policies 
of the past decades, such as the structural adjustment plan (SAP) and the market oriented 
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reforms of the 1980s and 90s (Bhagwati 1995) have been identified as major contributors 
to the problem.  Most of these policies were drafted under foreign influence (World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund) to meet requirements for debt relief and loans, and to 
compete in the international market (Bhagwati 1995).  These policies focused on 
economic growth and increasing food production, to the disadvantage of the 
environment, and without considering the long term well-being of the people they were 
meant to serve (IDS 1999).  
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem   
 
Cameroon is a country endowed with abundant forests.  The southern part of the country 
constitutes part of the spectacular lowland rain forest of Central Africa that stretches 
across regions of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.  For the past three 
decades, Cameroon has fast been loosing its portion of the rain forest.  
 
The rain forest of Cameroon is located between latitudes 2º and 5º north of the equator, 
occupying about 70% of the country’s land area.  The forest constitutes a diversity of 
fauna and flora that has put Cameroon on the biodiversity map of the world.   It is home 
to over 8,000 species of birds, close to 400 species of mammals, and more than 9,000 
plant species, 150 of which are found nowhere else in the world (MCBCC 2002).  The 
forest is also home to the indigenous (pygmies) peoples of the southern low lands of 
Cameroon, providing them with food, shelter, clothing, and their cultural and spiritual 
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survival.  It is also an invaluable asset for water conservation and a “living laboratory” 
for education, scientific research and recreation.  Cameroon’s rain forest, therefore, 
constitutes a complex ecological system that is critical not only to the nation and the 
region, but most to the global community as well.  If Cameroon’s rain forest is going to 
be sustained; sustaining it will have to be important to the people of Cameroon. 
 
Of Cameroon’s estimated 22 million hectares of forest resources, 14 million are tropical 
rainforest.  According to a recent African Development Bank (ADB) report, it is 
estimated that the forest sector of Cameroon contributes more than 3% of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) and accounts for 7% of total export (ADB 2003).  Despite the 
economic importance of the rain forest to the country’s economy, it has been 
disappearing at an average rate of 100,000 hectares per year (ADB 2003).  This alarming 
rate of deforestation is due to increasing activities such as lumbering, shifting cultivation, 
logging for trade and for fuel wood, and road construction (Cameroon 1992).  According 
to the ADB (1995), licensed logging companies in Cameroon were responsible for the 
lost of 64,550 km² of forest in 1994.  Environmental groups in the country, such as Bird 
Life International, Global Forest Watch (GFW) and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
have continued to fight against the increasing number of logging companies in the 
country.  According to a GFW report in 2000, between 1995 and 2000, the number of 
logging enterprises in Cameroon increased from 350 to 600, controlled by 25 logging 
companies (GFW 2000). 
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With increasing logging together with other land use activities, Cameroon’s tropical 
forest is fast disappearing and national and international environmental groups (non-
governmental organizations) fear at such a high rate of deforestation, the country’s rain 
forest might cease to exist in a matter of a few years from now, if something is not done 
to remedy the situation. 
 
Cameroon’s forest is a vital resource to the Central African region given that it fulfils 
critical environmental, economic, social and cultural functions in the region.  There is the 
need, to re-examine past forest policies in the country, determine their consequences on 
the environment, society and the economy, and develop/propose policies to protect the 
forest and promote sustainable socio-economic development in the country and the 




The objectives of this study are three fold:  first, describe/measure changes in land use 
and forest cover.  Second, correlate changes with colonial and domestic policies and 
third, develop/propose national policies to manage and conserve the forest resource.  
These objectives are achieved by: 
• Analyzing and quantifying changes in forest cover through the use of remotely sensed 
data, ground photographs and thematic maps.  Analysis is based on empirical 
statistical and spatial models; 
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• Identifying and estimating impacts of colonial and domestic environmental policies 
on forest loss and land cover change in Cameroon.  The forest loss and land cover 
change parameters for this study include: 
- Political and institutional structures:  
i. Public/private sector scenario; 
ii. Informal sector scenario. 
- Demographic structures: 
iii. Population growth; 
iv. Urbanization. 
- Socio-economic structures: 
v. Agricultural development; 
vi. Income distribution and poverty. 
• Estimating the implications of forest loss and land use cover change on: 
- The environment; 
- The economy; 
- The people at the community and national levels.  
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
 
This study covers seven major chapters besides the introduction and conclusion.  Chapter 
2 presents a brief review of Cameroon’s history beginning with the arrival of the 
Portuguese in the late 1400s up to the British and French colonial rule in the 1800s and 
1900s.  Chapter 2 also gives an overview of Cameroon’s geography, highlighting its 
climate and landscape distribution.  This geographic and historic overview is essential for 
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understanding the evolution of natural resource policy in Cameroon.  Understanding how 
Cameroon’s natural resource policy has evolved over time is essential for the 
development of new policies.  Chapter 3 takes a look at previous studies of land use and 
policies related to land use in Cameroon and elsewhere, and the impacts of these policies.  
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the nature of literature and methodology 
related to land use and forest policy in Cameroon, and to demonstrate the need for this 
study.  Chapter 4 describes the methods used to achieve the objectives of this study while 
Chapter 5 presents a remote sensing model used to measure the rate and degree of forest 
loss in Cameroon over a sixteen year period.  The remote sensing model is combined 
with an economic model to determine the driving forces behind forest loss in Cameroon.  
Chapter 6 provides a correlation of changes in forest cover to past and present policies.  
As noted by Smith (2003), one of the fundamental principles guiding decision-making in 
the public setting is the aggregation of individuals’ perception on public issues into a 
collective or unified option.  Therefore, Chapter 7 presents a practical model that 
employs ground thruthing methodologies for determining individual’s concerns for forest 
loss and its environmental impacts.  The purpose of this practical modeling exercise is to 
derive information from people experiencing actual conditions of forest loss in the field.  
Chapter 8 draws from the analysis of Chapters 5 through 7 to develop policies that will 
help conserve Cameroon’s forest.  The task of this chapter is to identify policy goals, 
constrains and objectives, and to select method(s) for identifying policy options.    
Finally, Chapter 9 provides general conclusions to the entire study and makes suggestions 




A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMEROON 
 
Cameroon was founded by Portuguese explorers in 1472.  The country was named by the 
explorers when they sailed up the prawn infested River Wouri into Douala.  They called 
it Rio dos Camarões, meaning “River of Prawns.”  The Portuguese explored Cameroon in 
the late 1400s and early 1500s.  In 1520 they set up the Trans-Atlantic slave trade 
network.  Beginning in the late 1500’s, Cameroon was settled by European traders and 
missionaries; Dutch traders in the 1600’s, British missionaries and traders in the 1700’s 
and early 1800’s, and the Germans in the late 1800’s.  Cameroon became a German 
colony (Kamerun) with defined boundaries in 1884 (figure 2.1).  Cameroon had its first 
development policies under the German administration.  The German administration set 
up plantations throughout the colony and developed policies for the management of these 
plantations and other natural resources. When the Germans lost the First World War, 
their colonies were taken over by the winners of the war.  The colony was divided into 
West and East Cameroons.  West Cameroon was in two parts – Southern and Northern 
Cameroons and administered as a single colony by the British under the League of 
Nations mandate.  The larger part of the colony, East Cameroon (Cameroun), was given a 
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mandate under the French (figure 2.2).  Parts of German Cameroon became part of 
French Equatorial Africa at this time.   
 
The system of governance evolved differently in West and East Cameroons.  The French 
embarked on a system of “direct rule” (forced labor) while the British adopted a system 
of “indirect rule” (use of natives). The British favored a more conservative resource and 
land use policy while the French followed an approach that was more exploitative.  Both 
colonies gained independence in 1960, and in 1961 English speaking West Cameroonians 
in the south voted in an infamous referendum (plebiscite) to join their French speaking 
brothers in East Cameroun while those in the northern part voted to remain with Nigeria.  
Southern Cameroon and East Cameroun were reunited in 1972 thus; the current 
international boundaries of Cameroon (figure 2.3) are as of 20th May, 1972 when the 
country became a United Republic. 
 
Today, Cameroon occupies a total area of 475,440 Km² (297,150 sq mi).  To the north it 
is bordered by the Republic of Chad.  To the west it is bordered by the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria and the Atlantic Ocean.  Its south neighbors are Equatorial Guinea, the 
Republic of Gabon, and the Republic of Congo.  It shares a long border to the east with 
Central Africa Republic.  The country has five geographic regions:  the northern plains, 
the Adamawa plateau, the eastern low lands, the coastal low lands, and the western high 
lands.  The country generally has a warm climate with slight variations due to altitude 
and distance from the sea.  The weather is dominated by rainy and dry seasons.  As one 
moves inland from the coast, rainfall reduces from 4318mm (170 inches) per year (over 
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seven months) to 813mm (32 inches) per year (limited to three months).  Temperature 
also follows the same pattern as rainfall, reducing from an average of 26˚C (79˚F) at 
Douala along the coast to 19˚C (66˚F) at Bamenda which is at a higher altitude in the 
hinterland.   
 
With these multiple geographic regions and differences in climate, Cameroon boasts of a 
multitude of ecosystems with major ones being; Sahelian savanna, Sudano-Guinean 
savanna, and Forest ecosystems.  A vibrant rain forest and swamps cover the coastal belt, 
with the forest spreading inland in the southeast.  These varieties of vegetation types also 
mean a diverse range of food crops and pastoral activities.  Due to this natural diversity 
coupled with its cultural pluralism, Cameroon is often referred to as “Africa in 
miniature.”   
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Figure 2.1: Map of Cameroon showing German protectorate boundaries (DeLancey 
and Mokeba 1990) 
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Figure 2.2: Map of Cameroon showing boundaries of British and French 
Cameroons (DeLancey and Mokeba 1990) 
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2.1 The Evolution of Natural Resource Policies in Cameroon 
Like most nations (Lowry 2003), environmental issues in Cameroon have gone through a 
number of stages.  Until now, the country has experienced five distinct eras of 
environmental issues and natural resources policy.  These eras can be identified as:  “law 
of contract vs. law of status,” “first colonial,” “second colonial,” and “post 
independence.”   
2.1.1 Law of contract vs. law of status era
Natural resource management in Cameroon is not a new thing.  The art and science of 
managing resources precedes the nation itself.  Before the institution of the “contract 
law” system of managing resources by the colonial administrations, the “law of status” 
was used by the indigenous people to regulate the use of what nature gave them.  
Hierarchy and regal ethics is the base of law of status.  The paramount traditional ruler of 
the people (chief) had the overall say in every aspect of the life of his subjects including 
how they use village resources.  This meant that management of natural resources was 
the responsibility of the chiefs.  The chiefs decided when to go hunting, where to hunt, 
and what type of animal to hunt.  It was a grievous crime for someone to venture into a 
forest to take any resource without the chief’s knowledge.  In fact, the extraction of 
resources was done collectively under the strict control of family heads, quarter heads, 
sub chiefs, and the chief.  In short, natural resources belonged to and were managed by 
the people.  
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2.1.2 The first colonial era
When the first colonial powers, the Germans, arrived in the 1890’s, and declared all 
natural resources state property, the law of status as a base for natural resource 
management began to erode away.  A new system based on the law of contract was 
instituted as the new administration in 1892 set up the first natural reserve in the country; 
the Limbe Botanical and Zoological Gardens (still exists today) and began setting up 
plantations in the coastal areas of the country.  Thus, formal forest administration in 
Cameroon began in the 1890s when the German colonial administration legally alienated 
communities from the vast majority of their land (Adeyoju 1976).  In 1912 the German 
administration established the Forest Service (FS) and introduced provisions for timber 
harvesting concession.  These provisions stipulated the improvement of logging and 
extraction techniques, the enforcement of minimum cutting diameters, and the execution 
of certain sivilcultural operations by the concessionaires (Adeyoju 1976).   
 
2.1.3 The second colonial era
After the First World War, between 1918 and 1947, German plantations were confiscated 
by colonial protectorates Britain and France, and vested in the state to be leased and 
developed by the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) for the benefit of 
Cameroon society as a whole (Acworth et al 2001).  The French and the British 
colonizers continued to manage the natural resources of Cameroon, though with different 
interests as shown by their system of management.  Although the French colonizers in the 
1930s began creating hunting reserves and educating the population on some basic 
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sivilcultural skills (Mengang 1998), it was all done for their interest and not for the 
interest of the people and their environment, as later seen from their “extraction” policies.   
While the British colonizers were more conservative in the management of forest 
resource in southern Cameroon, the French encouraged the expansion of logging 
activities in the eastern part of Cameroon (Adeyoju 1976).  In the early 1930s, the British 
colonial administration established the Forestry Department and the Native 
Administration (NA), and used the concept of “indirect rule” to control all unoccupied 
land and forest resources (Jua 1999; Chilver 1963).  In efforts to ease land and forest 
resource management for the Native Administrators, the Colonial Forestry Department 
established Forest Reserves in the 1940s and 50s.  
 
2.1.4 The post independence era
When Cameroon was granted independence in October of 1961, management of forest 
resources became a shared responsibility of the Native Administration and the State 
Forestry Service (Acworth et al 2001).  In the years following independence, the 
management of natural resources was the shared responsibility of a number of 
government ministries, including the Rural Development Secretariat, the Department of 
Tourism, and the Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Husbandry.  During these 
years, forest resources, water resources and agriculture were managed by the Rural 
Development Secretariat.  In 1972 a Ministry of Agriculture was created taking the 
responsibility of managing forest and water resources, while park management was 
entrusted to the Department of Tourism.   
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In 1973, twelve years after independence, the State passed Land Ordinances, declaring all 
lands as national lands and putting them under its control (Acworth et al 2001).  Inspired, 
by the colonial administration the state in 1974 and 76 passed Land Tenure legislations 
putting a stop to traditional land tenure systems.  Forest exploitation and the management 
of land resources operated under the Land Ordinances of 1973 until 1994 when a new 
forestry policy was passed into law.  
 
These four eras of resource management in Cameroon were characterized by 
fragmentation of the management process which made it difficult for the forestry 
administration to see the forest as an integrated unit.  The management of natural 
resource elements like forest, water, parks, and wildlife by different ministries fostered 
the single-product use doctrine that puts emphasis on individual elements of the forest 
ecosystem and not on the entire ecosystem. Also, by declaring all forests public lands and 
alienating the local population from getting involved in the management process, the 
colonial administration created animosity and resistance within forest communities.  This 
resistance led to illegal activities, notably illegal logging and consequently corruption 
within the Native Administration that acted as a link between the colonial administration 
and the local population.   
 
2.2 Current Policies and Impacts 
 
Even though the traditional tenure system has been relegated to the background of 
resource management since the colonial period and abolished in 1974, the tenure system 
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has persisted to the present.  The management of forest resources remained the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture until 1992 when it was taken over by a new 
Ministry; the Ministry of Environment and Forest.  Although forest resource management 
now has a separate Ministry, a number of its activities still reside with other Ministries. 
 
The year 1992 saw a new beginning in the history of natural resource management in 
Cameroon.  As a signatory to the Rio Earth Summit agreements on global warming and 
biological diversity, the Cameroon government was required to establish a Ministry of 
Environment which was to oversee the management of the nation’s natural resources as 
well as protect the environment.  To that obligation the government in 1992 brought 
together the forest and wildlife sectors in the Department of Agriculture and the 
Department of Tourism to form the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MINEF).  The 
creation of this Ministry precipitated institutional and legislative changes which had been 
in process since 1989.  Two years after the creation of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry, the Parliament in 1994 tabled a new forestry policy and passed new forestry 
laws.  Prominent in the new forestry policy is the Land Use Planning frame work (zoning 
plan), the National Environmental Management Program (NEMP) and the National 
Energy Plan.  Together, these policy components are aimed at enhancing rural economic 
activities and fostering sustainable management of forest resources in the country 
(Mengang 1998).  So far, this objective has not been attained.  Environmental policy in 







3.1 Previous Studies of Land Use and Environmental Policy in 
Cameroon and Impacts of these Policies 
 
This section reviews the historical development of public forest management in 
Cameroon covering the pre-colonial, colonial, and post independence periods.  It 
describes policies related to development, trade, plantations, and scientific exploitation, 
and how these policies account for the present forest management structure in Cameroon.  
No deforestation model existed during the pre-colonial and colonial periods hence a 
historical approach is used to illustrate resource use policies.  
 
3.1.1 Pre-colonial period
Prior to the arrival of the first colonial administration in Cameroon, the management of 
natural resources was managed according to the people’s law (i.e. law of status).  
Resource use was coordinated by the paramount chief with sub-chiefs given the 
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responsibility of protecting resources within their localities for the benefit of all 
members.  Resources were extracted and used on a collective base, with every individual 
or family receiving resources according to their needs.  For example, Mengang (1998, 
239) notes that “when a hunting party returned to a village, all the animals killed were 
brought to the chief whose duty was to distribute the meat to all villagers.”  Therefore, it 
was illegal for any villager to venture into the village forests without the chief’s 
permission.  Also, with no established monetary unit at this time, resources were well 
protected by the village leaders to maintain the “barter” system upon which their 
economy depended.  With the arrival of European traders in the late 1700s, villagers 
began undermining native laws governing the use of resources.  Lulled by ostentatious 
goods from Europe, like salt, mirrors, matches, and machetes, villagers began obtaining 
forest resources without permission from the chiefs, in order to exchange them for these 
goods.  Thus, with expansion in trade-by-barter and the introduction of a monetary 
system, the regal ethics system that had guided the use of resources in primitive 
Cameroon society for thousands of years began to collapse.  
 
3.1.2 Colonial period 
3.1.2.1 Early colonial period 
 
Even though European ventures in Cameroon pre-date the nation itself, the earliest 
account of European settlement and interaction with the indigenous people was in the late 
1700s and early 1800s by Spanish, English, French, and German explorers, traders, and 
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missionaries.  The English dominated trade during this period and developed close 
relations with the local chiefs in the costal regions of Douala and Bimbia (or Victoria as 
the English called it (Limbe)).  The English domination was not without rivalry from the 
German and French traders with vested interest in the business.  The English government 
in 1842 made an agreement with two native kings to encourage lawful trade in ivory, 
kola, palm oil and palm kernels (Rudin 1938).  This was an effort to stop the slave trade 
that was being discouraged by many European governments.  Although the English 
government encouraged trade between English traders and the natives, it had no interest 
in annexing the territory even at the request of traders, missionaries, and the native kings 
(Rudin 1938).  The English government’s refusal to annex the territory meant no official 
trade, exploitation, and development policies guided transactions between the English 
traders and the natives.   Although the traders relied on the “court of equity” to resolve 
disputes in the territory, unguided trade and exploitation continued in the territory until 
German annexation in 1884 (Rudin 1938).  
 
3.1.2.2 German colonial policies 
 
By the time of German annexation in July 14th 1884, trade in tropical produce had 
intensified and formed an important pull factor in the annexation agenda.  With their 
government firmly in control of the territory, German planters began establishing 
plantations in the coastal region of the territory.  These plantations were established by 
firms and individual planters, who engaged in extensive clearing of forest along the coast 
to create space for their plantations (Rudin 1938).  According to Rudin, the number of 
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German planters increased from 7 in 1891 to 182 in 1913.  Two trading firms existed at 
that time: the Woermann and Jantzen firm, and the Thormählen firm.  With increasing 
demand for wood in Europe, principally for shipbuilding and canal piling, these trading 
firms began exploiting the forest for commercial purpose (Adeyoju 1976).  Deforestation, 
therefore, was not only to create open fields for the development of plantations but also to 
export the logs to Germany.  At first, German exploiters concentrated mainly on ebony 
logs but later on extended their exploitation to other African wood species like Iroko 
(African Oak), Mahogany, and Sapele (Adeyoju 1976).  The increase in number of 
planters coupled with increase in demand for wood meant an increase in deforested areas.  
Roads and railways were constructed through the forest to support plantation and logging 
activities.  For example the construction of a 168 Km (104 miles) of rail track linking 
Bonaberi and Nkongsamba from1906 to 1911, and the 280 Km (174 miles) of road 
linking Kribi and Yaounde in 1913 took place within the rain forest.  By 1913, the 
Germans had constructed a total of 360 Km (224 miles) of rail tracks, 500 Km (311 
miles) of roads in the forest region of Cameroon, and established 100,000 hectares (386 
miles²) of plantations in Limbe (Rudin 1938, 240).   
 
The activities of these firms and individual planters flourished such that it created an 
economic base and attracted the intervention of the German government.  Though the 
German government’s intervention was mainly for taxation purposes, it did to a lesser 
extent regulate the firms’ activities for the purpose of conservation.  For example, the 
German colonial administration established a forest service and introduced specific 
provisions to guide timber harvesting.  These provisions include enforcement of logging 
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and extraction techniques, minimum cutting diameters, and silvicultural operations 
(Hedin 1930).  Even though German traders initially welcomed the annexation of the 
territory by their Government, they never welcomed its intervention in their business 
affairs.  The German business community argued that “the government could not regulate 
their activities without their consent because they had charters to acquire licenses and 
concessions in the forest predating the political administration (Adeyoju 1976, 3).”  With 
increasing competition and rivalry among exploitation companies, obtaining timber 
concessions from land owners became so complicated that the exploiters expressed the 
need for intervention and arbitration from the German government.  Also, with the 
dwindling number of valuable species, it was apparent to timber traders that the trade was 
at risk of collapsing if nothing was done to control exploitation.  To this effect, German 
exploiters and planters eventually accepted and supported their government’s 
development policies for the resources in the new colony.  As pointed out by Adeyoju 
(1976, 5), the German forest law in Cameroon consisted of nine main provisions:  
1. Reservation of forest Areas; 
2. Classification of forest offences and procedure for the arrest and prosecution 
of offenders; 
3. Issuance and control of timber licenses; 
4. Issuance of special licenses for the local use of wood and secondary forest 
produce; 
5. Compounding of forest offenses by duly appointed forest officers; 
6. Establishment of the procedures and functions of the forest service; 
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7. Prescription of circumstances in which bona fide land owners and certain 
forest operators could take specified forest produce free of charge; 
8. Rule governing the payment of fees and royalties for forest produce 
harvested; and  
9. Responsibilities for licenses for the establishment and maintenance of 
succeeding forest crops.  
 
This legislation enabled the German government to quickly establish forest reserves and 
control logging by German exploiters and the shifting cultivation practice by the natives.  
The German government also established a forest service to ensure the implementation of 
these policies.  The forest service was mostly staffed by Germans who received special 
training in tropical forest management in Berlin or in the Colonial Institute in Hamburg 
(Rudin 1938).  A Botanical Garden was also established in Bimbia (still in existence 
today) to deal with scientific aspects of forest exploitation.  A special agricultural school 
was also established in Bimbia (Limbe) to train natives in forest and agricultural 
management.  According to Adeyoju (1976), the training received by the natives was 
very basic and did not prepare them for dealing with real professional issues.  This was a 
strategy to keep the natives from detecting the colonizer’s alternative policies and to 
render them powerless when it came to political negotiations.  
 
The architect of these policies was the Colonial Society and its Economic Committee that 
was established by Bismark under the German colonial constitution.  Article 1 of this 
constitution concentrated power in the hands of the Kaiser.  This was to reduce 
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contestations over colonial legislative issues in the Reichstag (parliament) and to expedite 
exploitation of the colony (Rudin 1938).  This centralized control through the Kaizer 
pleased the colonialists as they were able to run their affairs with less interference from 
the Reichstag.   
 
3.1.2.3 English colonial policies 
 
Following Germany’s defeat in World War I, Cameroon was mandated to Britain and 
France by the League of Nations.  The League of Nations accorded the western part of 
the country to Britain and the eastern part to France.  The western part of Cameroon was 
administered as Nigerian territory until 1961 when the southern part of the territory 
became part of east Cameroon, while the northern part remained with Nigeria (see figure 
2.2).  Hence, English forest policies in Nigeria were enforced in the English-speaking 
part of Cameroon.  The British established seven forest ordinances to guide forest 
management in British-Cameroon.  Under these ordinances, a reservation program was 
created to protect forest areas that were already showing signs of over exploitation by 
timber exploiters and poor farming practices by the natives (Adeyoju 1976).  Prominent 
provisions of the ordinances include:  
1. The obligation of a timber operator to plant seven saplings for each felled tree; 
2. Acquisition of land in which the destruction of forest affected continuous supply 
of forest produce; 
3. The establishment of itinerant courts to speed up the reserve program; 
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4. The establishment of the Native Authority (NA) to control all unoccupied land 
and forest resources; and 
5. The requirement that not less than 25 per cent of the land be set aside as forest 
reserves.  
The British forest administration in Cameroon was faced with the problem of a shortage 
of staff to implement these policies.  Natives had to be trained in forest management 
techniques in Government or Native Authority schools.  Local chiefs were also trained 
and “Anglicized” as the British had to rely on the concept of indirect rule (Chilver 1963), 
by which local chiefs were charged with implementing and enforcing these policies.   
 
Although the British administration experienced a shortage of trained foresters, it 
nevertheless continued the scientific forest management program that was started by the 
German government.  The British government maintained the Botanical Garden in 
Victoria (Limbe), establishing branches in the 1930s and introducing botanical names for 
species in local languages (Adeyoju 1976).  The British also maintained and expanded 
plantations created by the Germans.  They vested all private plantations in the state and 
placed them under a parastatal: the Cameroon Development Corporation.  Although 
Britain, like any other colonialist was out to maximize economic exploitation of its 
colonies, it did so in a more conservative manner, especially with regards to the 
management of forest resources.   
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3.1.2.4 French colonial policies 
 
Unlike the British who adopted a more conservative approach to forest management, the 
French colonial administration encouraged the expansion of forest activities in many 
parts of the colony.  Adeyoju (1976, 4) notes that construction of the Douala – Yaounde 
railway by the French was to facilitated the transportation of logs from the interior of the 
country to the port of export in Douala.  Also, according to a 1939 publication titled The 
Work of France in the Cameroons, between 1922 and 1937, the French constructed 6,000 
Km (3728 miles) of permanent and seasonal roads and 165 Km (103 miles) of railway in 
the colony.   Most of these roads and railways traversed the dense rain forest that covers 
the southern part of the colony.  This development venture by the French colonial 
administration led to a two fold increase in log exports in comparison to the pre-war level 
(Centre D’informations Documantaires 1939).  This correlation between development 
and export of a forest resource supports a post independence accusation by Cameroonians 
that French development in the colony was mainly “drainage development” (Mengang 
1998).  That is, the French colonial administration embarked mainly on development 
projects that facilitated the exploitation of the colony and cared less about the welfare of 
the people and their environment.  However, in 1946, the French introduced basic forest 
legislation in the territory through a general decree (ordinances) on forestry and land use.  
Prominent provisions of the French colonial forestry policies in Cameroon include: 
1. The reorganization of a 1920 forestry service to cater for log exploiting services; 
2. The creation of botanical and vegetation institutions to promote studies on the 
potential value of forest resources; and 
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3. Reinforcement of state ownership of all forest lands in the colony.  
The 1946 forestry legislation was in use until 1973 when a national forest law was 
enacted.  The 1973 law was prompted by reunification of the English and French 
speaking Cameroons whose forest legislations had evolved along different lines. 
 
From this historical review, it can be concluded that colonial forest management in 
Cameroon was mainly for the economic benefit of the colonizers with little or no concern 
for the welfare of the Cameroonian people and their environment.  While policies of the 
French colonial administration focused more on resource exploitation and alienation of 
communities from forest lands, the English administration’s policies encouraged 
conservative use of resources and the involvement of natives in the affairs of the colony 
more than the French.  Like the French, the Germans also encouraged resource 
exploitation but to a lesser extent than the French.  
 
3.1.3 Post-Independence
With a majority (8 of 10 provinces) of Cameroon having a French background, the post- 
colonial government continued with the exploitative policies of its French colonial 
power, largely neglecting the more conservative policies of the English.  Cameroon’s 
post-independence resource exploitation policy is, in a way, inspired by the 1972 
constitution.  The constitution stipulates in its preamble that Cameroon was determined to 
“exploit its natural wealth in order to ensure the well-being of every citizen by raising 
living standards.”  The constitution does not limit resource exploitation nor specify how 
29
the resources should be extracted to avoid depletion and environmental degradation.   
Although some modifications were made to the original French colonial forestry law after 
independence (1962, 1968, and 1973), it was not until the 1980s that Cameroon became 
really conscious of environmental protection (Nasong’o and Gabsa 1998).  Important 
forest related laws since the 1980s include: 
1. Law No 81/13 of 27 November 1981 stipulating the judicial regime of forestry, 
wildlife, and fisheries; 
2. Law No 83/169 of April 12, 1983 on forestry regulations; and 
3. Law No 83/170 of April 12, 1983 on wildlife regulations.  
These forest related reforms of the 1980s gave birth to a new Ministry in 1992; the 
Ministry of Environment and Forest (MINEF).  Although the creation of this new 
Ministry was a significant development, the crown event for the forest sector was the 
enactment of a new forestry law in 1994; law No 94/01 of January 20 1994 on forestry 
regulations.  The forest sector has since been operating under this law.  
 
3.1.3.1 Land use studies since the 1980s 
 
The forestry reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s prompted academic research, 
especially in the area of social sciences in forestry.  Most of this research was/is funded 
by international environmental groups and non-governmental organizations with stakes in 
the global forest and land use cover change.  Research in the 1980s focused mostly on 
forestry education and policies. For example, Fultang (1988) examined how the 
government of Cameroon was educating its people on forestry issues.  Carman (1989) 
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also did a study on how the government enforced the 1981 and 1983 laws governing the 
harvesting of its rain forests.  Also, in efforts to understand forest distribution in 
Cameroon, and how its forest sector operates, a two part study titled Cameroon and its 
forests was carried out by Faure (1989 and 1990).  In the first part (1989), Faure did a 
comprehensive study of Cameroon’s natural landscape while the second part (1990), 
focused on analysis of Cameroon’s forest sector.  Similar studies on Cameroon’s forestry 
sector activities include Aube (1993), Besong (1992), Fultang (1992), and Eba’ayti 
(1998).  These authors examined the structure of Cameroon’s forestry sector, its 
development, and its role in the country’s economy.  Studies in the late 1990s and early 
2000 focused mostly on communal and agro forestry.  For example, Thomas et al (2001) 
did a study on decentralization of forest management through community forestry 
management in the Kilum-Ijim forest in the Northwest province of Cameroon.  In a 
similar study Acworth et al (2001) showed how the Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) has 
empowered the local people of the Onge-Mokoko forest area in the Southwest province 
in managing their forest resource.  Djeumo (2001) traced the origins and development of 
community forestry in Cameroon.  Still in another study, Fomété and Vermaat (2001) 
examined potential impacts of community forestry on rural poverty in Cameroon. 
 
The increase in land use studies in Cameroon has certainly drawn the world’s attention to 
the problem of forest loss that the country is currently facing.  But research alone is 
meaningless if action is not taken by the government to address issues pointed out by 
these studies.  
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3.2 Previous Studies of Regional and National Land Use Changes  
 
Most models of deforestation are designed to support less complex multidimensional 
processes.  This is because deforestation is a social problem and, like all social models, 
deforestation models focus only on a few of the many variables involved in the cause and 
effect relationship in land use (Kiamowitz and Angels 1998).  Lambin (1997) noted that 
the multidimensional nature of deforestation processes has led to different research 
approaches in deforestation studies.  This is reflected in the plethora of literature on 
deforestation models, most of which were developed in the 1990s. Deforestation studies 
take into consideration the issue of scale.  The size of the unit of analysis under study is 
an important aspect of any deforestation studies (Kiamowitz and Angels 1998).  
Kiamowitz and Angels assert that “factors affecting deforestation, the interactions 
between them and the magnitude of their effects vary significantly from one location to 
the other” (Kiamowitz and Angels 1998, 4).  These authors are right in their assertion 
because even though two localities may suffer from the same land use problem, the 
contributing data and processes that led to the problem may be fundamentally different.  
Lambin (1994) argues that “at broad scale, the high level of aggregation of data obscures 
the variability of situations and relationships and produces meaningless averages” 
(Lambin 1994, 15).  However, we can not deny that some local scale problems may only 
be understood when studied at a broader scale, since a local scale problem may only be 
part of a larger problem when put together.  Therefore, studies in deforestation vary in 
scale from individual households/firm, small land areas, regions, countries and the world.  
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Apart from the use of scale, researchers in this field apply a variety of methods in their 
studies including analytical, simulation, and regression methods.  Therefore, a review of 
existing literature on deforestation should focus on two criteria: Scale and methodology.
3.2.1 Household and firm level studies
The household is the smallest unit on the scale of deforestation studies and is always the 
starting point of most studies.  Studies done at the household and firm level have mostly 
used conventional models in which it is assumed that actions of agents of deforestation 
are influenced externally by prices, technology, institutions and infrastructure 
(Kiamowitz and Angels 1998).  Though agents’ behavior is exogenously influenced, the 
free movement of labor between farm and off farm sectors makes population endogenous 
(Kiamowitz and Angels 1998).  In these studies the agents’ decision to maintain or cut 
down a piece of forest land is contingent upon the agents’ socioeconomic status such as 
income level, size of household, and land holdings (Parks et al 1998).  For example, 
Barbier and Burgress (2001) did a study on land expansion in which they employed a 
number of approaches, including a farm level approach.  The results of this study showed 
that agricultural expansion is the main factor determining land expansion and forest loss 
in most areas of the tropical world.  From a policy view point, governments must 
consider carefully their role in influencing local patterns of deforestation and forest 
degradation.  States that support frontier expansion (e.g. Brazil) and those that sponsor 
logging activities (e.g. Philippines) (Kummer 1991) must revise their policies.  Verburg 
et al (2004) developed a dynamic model that combines spatial and household data to 
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analyze and determine accessibility and land use pattern.  The attractiveness of this model 
is based on its ability to measure and explain the spatial pattern of different land-use 
types.  For example, results of this analysis indicate that the relation between land use 
and accessibility is dependent on the specific characteristics of the different land-use 
types.  In a similar study Walker (1999) employs an agent based model of shifting 
cultivation that integrates household production theory and the concept of optimal forest 
rotation to explain patterns of land use and forest structure beyond the extensive margin 
of agriculture.  A policy application of Walkers’ study can be related to rural violence 
stemming from land scarcity.  Governments need to develop policies that will reduce 
overall dependence of rural dwellers on land.  Using a similar approach, Poole (2004) 
used poverty alleviation strategies for people whose livelihoods depend significantly on 
tree and forest resources to demonstrate how tree and forest-dependent peoples can be 
integrated into the wider economy.  The result of Poole’s study indicates that there is the 
necessity for governments to develop policies that enhance utilization of indigenous tree 
species within the household as well as integrating it into the wider economy.   
 
In another household level study, Binam et al (2003) used a Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) model to compute farm-level technical efficiency (TE) for a sample of 81 peasant 
farmers in the low-income region of Côte d'Ivoire.  The results of their study suggest that 
substantial gains in output and/or decreases in cost can be attained given existing 
technology.  In the same study, the authors used two-limit Tobit regression techniques to 
examine the relation between technical efficiency and various farm/farmer 
characteristics.  This second approach showed the role variables such as family size, 
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membership to a farmer's club or association, and the origin of farmers play in agents’ 
actions.  Governments should therefore develop policies that enable farmers to create and 
participate in club activities.  The authors also suggest that policy makers should consider 
policies that will facilitate public sector involvement in the provision of information on 
labor force management to peasant farmers.  This will improve efficiency levels, and thus 
household incomes.   
 
Other studies that employ analytical open economy models with exogenous variables 
include: Angelsen (1994) and Deininger and Minten (1996).  Angelsen’s (1994) land 
fallow and property rights study showed that lower discount rates may improve land 
management in already cleared areas but increase deforestation.  Deininger and Minten 
(1996) used Chayanovian model to determine the effect of allocation of time by 
household and hired labor on farm activities.  They found that agricultural productivity 
improvements that affect only already cleared land reduce additional deforestation by 
inducing farmers to devote more time to land already under cultivation.  
 
3.2.2 Regional level studies
Next on the scale of deforestation studies is the regional level.  Both spatial and non-
spatial models have been used to analyze deforestation and other land use changes at the 
regional level.  Not until the early 1990s, when Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
technologies became a facilitating tool for the study of spatial phenomenon, few 
economic models dealt with issues of spatial dimension like deforestation (Kaimowitz 
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and Angelsen 1998).  Since the introduction of GIS as a tool for analyzing spatial 
phenomenon, a number of GIS-driven economic models have been developed.  
Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) note that despite growth in economic models that 
analyze land use in a spatial context, very few of these models combine household and 
regional level analysis.  These authors acknowledge the Dynamic Ecological – Land 
Tenure Analysis (DELTA) model as one of such few models.  The DELTA model has 
been used by several land use land cover change researchers including Southworth et al. 
(1991a,b) and Dale et al. (1993a,b, 1994).  
 
Designed to determine how attractive a parcel of land is to potential users, the DELTA 
model uses spatial data such as soil quality, natural vegetation, distance to roads and 
markets, etc, to rank and determine how many land users colonize a parcel of land at any 
given time period.  Results of DELTA model analysis showed that when a parcel of land 
is located closer to infrastructures like roads or to facilities like markets, and/or when the 
land is of high soil quality, the probability that that parcel of land will be deforested 
increases.  This particular conclusion has been criticized by Kaimowitz and Angelsen 
(1998) on grounds that the model makers “assume, rather than prove” their point.  From a 
policy view point, the DELTA model could be useful in proving that policy makers need 
to always strive for a balance between the quality and quantity of policies they make with 
regards to land use.   
 
Other studies based on spatial simulation models include Verburg et al. (2004), Monroe 
et al. (2004), and William et al. (2002). Verburg et al. (2004) used different measures of 
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accessibility such as distance, transportation cost and population size to test accessibility 
for a rural area at the forest fringe in the northeastern Philippines.  Based on the capacity 
of different measures to explain the spatial patterns of different land use types, these 
authors found that, due to the presence of relatively dense and better road network in the 
northwestern part of the study area, it takes only 2 hours and 2 hours 15 minutes to get to 
San Jose and Del Pilar from San Mariano respectively.  On the other hand, due to poor 
road network and the difficult topography, it takes between 5 and 9 hours to get to the 
eastern fringes of the study area.  The authors conclude that logging accessibility follows 
a similar pattern as road accessibility.  Policy makers must therefore consider 
accessibility as a limiting factor to forest conservation and make necessary policy 
adjustments when drafting policies on road development projects.   
 
In the study by Monroe et al. (2004), an empirical spatial model of land use based on 
production factors of land, labor, and capital is used to analyze land cover change in 
western Honduras.  The model employs two econometric approaches; the Multinomial 
Logit approach and the Binary Logit approach to detect changes in land cover from 1987 
to 1996 as a function of agricultural suitability and transportation costs.  Combining 
ground-truth satellite image analysis with analysis of the econometric model, the study 
showed that while significant reforestation had taken place between 1987 and 1996, a 
new area was deforested.  The model attributed these changes to market accessibility 
(measured by cost of access) and topography.  The model’s strength is in its ability to 
capture changes between classes, in this case, deforestation and reforestation.  The study 
by William et al. (2002) uses GIS spatial data to assess the effects of biophysical (annual 
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rainfall, dry season severity, soil fertility, soil water logging, soil depth, linear distances 
to the nearest paved highway, unpaved road and navigable river) and anthropocentric 
(rural-population density, urban-population size) predictors on deforestation in Brazilian 
Amazonia.  Dividing the area into 1900 quadrates of 50 x 50 km, the model was 
programmed to randomly select and rank 120 quadrates on the bases of deforestation 
intensity.  The researchers then carried out an ordination analysis to identify orthogonal 
gradients among the predictor variables. Finally, a multiple regression analysis was 
carried out to determine correlation of the variables with deforestation.  The results 
indicated that highway density and rural-population size were highly correlated to 
deforestation.  
 
In general, results of these regional level studies are not different from those of the 
analytical household studies reviewed earlier.   In both groups of studies, it is concluded 
that forest areas closer to roads, village settlements, and markets are prone to 
deforestation than those farther from these infrastructures.  Also, forest areas with better 
biophysical factors such as higher quality soils and drier climates are more likely to be 
cleared.      
 
3.2.3 National and macro-level studies    
National and macro-level unit is the largest on the scale of deforestation studies. 
Although most national and macro-level models support cross country analysis, the 
models reviewed here are those designed mainly to analyze deforestation and other land 
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use activities at the country level.  These models are similar to the ones reviewed under 
household and firm level studies, except that in this case endogenous variables are added 
and computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis is involved.  As pointed out by 
Kiamowitz and Angelsen (1998 53), adding CGE model analysis to household and firm 
level analysis determines decision parameters which are an important link to 
macroeconomic variables and policy instruments.  For instance, Martens et al. (2002) and 
Agnes and Ian (2005), studied subsistence agriculture and commercially oriented farming 
systems in upland and forest margin areas of Southeast Asia to determine their influence 
on forest exploitation.  In a study that involves activities of the agricultural and forestry 
sectors, Pearce (2001) examined the economic value of forest ecosystems, while Owusu 
(1998) examined log export and structural adjustment programs as activities of the 
forestry and manufacturing sectors.   
 
In the study by Martens et al. (2002), the authors tried to improve our understanding of 
deforestation by crossing spatial analysis and livestock economic studies.  The authors 
employed non-linear models to determine how landscape dynamics are related to 
infrastructure development, ecological conditions, zoning policies and to the evolution 
and organization of production, consumption and marketing chains of livestock products 
in the Brazilian State of Pará.  The study indicates that road construction investments in 
electrical energy, financial credit for cattle ranching and soybean, and poorly conceived 
land reform policies are the main drivers of deforestation in Brazil.  
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The study by Agnes and Ian (2005) examines traditional and commercial agricultural 
land use systems in Southeast Asia to demonstrate that the former is linked to “patterns of 
order and balance between a people's needs and the sustainability of their resources” 
while the later is linked to “disorder and destruction of resources.”  The authors argue 
that a shift from traditional land and resource use institutions to a centralized market 
driven system of land and resource used is to blame for forest exploitation.  They point to 
the fact that state assertion of forest land and lack of secured property rights over land 
leads to encroachment on forest land by landless farmers.  From a policy view point, the 
authors argue that policies and institutions should be structured such as to absorb the 
pressures of economic development on forest lands and other resources.  This can be 
achieved through decentralization that involves transparency in the use of resources, 
responsible governance, and accountability.   
 
In Awusu (1998), simple analytical approaches are used to study Ghana’s forest sector 
which, since adopting the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment program, 
has experienced an increase in wood exports.  Awusu’s analysis showed a direct link 
between adjustment and deforestation.  He points to government’s need to service 
external debts and local currency devaluations as an underlying cause of deforestation 
arguing that governments of forested nations have sacrificed their forests in order to 
adjust their economies and meet their political interests.   
 
In Pearce’s (2001) study, he used three well known economic valuation methods; 
contingent valuation (willingness to pay), travel cost method, and hedonic pricing (land 
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value) to demonstrate that all ecological functions of forests have economic values.  The 
results of his analysis favored forest conservation and sustainable use over conversion to 
other uses.  For this reason he argues that decisions whether to conserve forests or 
convert them to other uses should be based on comparative analysis of the use of forest 
land for other purposes and the economic values accorded to its non-market benefits.  He 
asserts that this type of forest economic valuation helps policy makers “design markets 
that capture the value ideally for the benefit of the many vulnerable communities that rely 
on the forests for their well-being.”   
 
A number of studies carried out in the 1990s show a correlation between policies and 
forest loss.  For example, Pearce and Warford (1993) carried out a study in Mexico, 
Indonesia, Costa Rica, and Malaysia to determine the effect of market policy on forest 
exploitation.  In that study, they looked at different market and non-market values of 
timber such as carbon storage, pharmaceutical, ecotourism/recreation, watershed 
protection, existence value, and option value.  Analyses of these variables in all four 
countries indicate that markets do not take into account non-priced benefits and costs. 
They argue that market policies that favor high discount rates in these countries have 
encouraged deforestation.  Another study by Reppeto (1993) showed that mistaken policy 
intervention by governments can lead to deforestation.  For example, he examined road 
construction in the Brazilian state of Para and found that deforestation, following road 
construction, increased from 0.6% to 17.3% of the state’s area between 1972 and 1985.  
A Similar study by Kaimowitz (1997) on mines and estates development in forest lands 
in Bolivia also exemplifies policy failures that led to forest decline.   
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Studies have also been carried out which show that government subsidy policies 
contribute to forest loss.  For example, a study of government subsidy in the Philippines 
by Kummer (1991), suggested that the granting of subsidies to farmers and ranchers led 
to a decline of about 25% of the nation’s forest cover in the early 1990s.  Also, studies by 
Gray (1997), Wilkinson (1998), and Kartodiharjo and Supriona (2000) indicate that 
Guyana, Indonesia, and Ghana, respectively, have large portions of their forest lands 
under concessions, resulting from government subsidy policies.  
 
Poorly designed policies that plunged most developing nations into the infamous “debt 
crisis” have also been linked to forest loss in these countries.  Examining the debt and 
deforestation link, Khan and McDonald (1995) analyzed data from 68 countries over a 
four year period (1981 to 1985) and found that debt service has a negative influence on 
forest management.  These studies suggest a correlation between resource policy and 
forest loss.  
 
Policies can be a powerful driving force in the management of the natural environment. 
When well conceived, policies can lead to the sustainable use of resources, creating a 
situation by which the society strives to match its needs with its natural resources by 
influencing people’s perception of their needs and wants.  Policies influence decision- 
making at every level of the society including the three components of sustainable 
development; namely economic efficiency, environmental integrity and social well-being. 
Policies therefore play an indispensable role in the sustainable management of the 
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environment and its resources and should be developed with care, taking into 







This section describes the methods used to attain the objectives of this study.  First, a 
brief description of the study areas and reasons for their selection is made.  This is 
followed by a description of the methods employed.  That is, what tests, what purpose, 
and what objective(s) the methods are aimed to address.  This study made use of both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods.  The quantitative approach is based on 
analysis of changes in forest cover using remote sensing techniques and empirical 
statistical and spatial models.  The qualitative approach involves analyzing socio-
economic, agricultural, and population data.  
 
The literature reviewed in chapter 3 indicates that deforestation is a complex topic to 
study.  Due to this complexity it is important to define the scope and limit the area(s) 
involved in any deforestation study.  It is also important to simplify the analysis of any 
deforestation study to better understand the cause and effect relationship (Angelsen 1994; 
Kiamowitz and Angels 1998).  Also, Masser (1984) cautions that any research that 
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is of a comparative nature should not be too ambitious and that its scope should be 
narrowed down.  Therefore this study is limited to two study areas:  the Buea/Limbe 
region and the Bertoua region in the Southwest and East Provinces of Cameroon 
respectively.  Selection of the Buea/Limbe study area is for the following reasons:  first, 
the region covers a significant portion (248,726 hectares) of Cameroon’s forest land.  
Second, politically, Buea has been the seed of both colonial (German and British) and 
domestic administrations.  Third, the Buea/Limbe population (English speaking) interacts 
closely with the Douala population (French speaking) hence, an ideal region for a 
national (bi-cultural) study.  Fourth and lastly, the region is host to major national forest 
conservation projects like the Mount Cameroon Project and the Limbe Botanical Garden.  
The Bertoua region was chosen for the following reasons:  First, the East province has the 
largest area of rainforest in Cameroon.  Second, Bertoua is the heart of timber production 
in the country.  Third, the region is largely rural with a majority of its population living a 
subsistence life which makes it suitable for comparison with the Buea/Limbe region 
which is made of predominantly urban dwellers.  Fourth and lastly, the region is a 
prototype for the French colonial and post colonial forest management policies in 
Cameroon.  Table 4.1 is a summary of attributes comparing the two study areas. 
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Table 4.1: Reasons for extrapolating the study areas 
Buea/Limbe Study Area Bertoua Study Area 
Covers a significant forest area (248,726 ha) Has the largest area of rainforest in the country 
Seed of German and British administrations Prototype for French forest management policies 
Has a bicultural background with higher degree of 
urban lifestyle 
Shows a higher degree of rural lifestyle 
Host to major conservation projects Timber production center in the country 
4.1 Scope of Study and Study Areas 
This study consists of two test sites (Figure 4.1).  The first test site is located around the 
towns of Buea and Limbe in the Southwest province of Cameroon.  This area constitutes 
part of the tropical rain forest of the central African region.  This area has a total of about 
248,726 hectares of forest land.  It is host to one of the world’s richest conservation sites, 
Mount Cameroon.  According to Mount Cameroon Biodiversity Conservation Centre 
(MCBCC) this area has 49 strictly endemic plant species and approximately 50 endemic 
animal species.  The population of the area is estimated at about 300,000 inhabitants.  
More than 50% of the population lives in the urban settlements of Buea and Limbe.  Four 
historical clans settled in this area:  Bakweri, Bamboko, Balundo, and Bimbia clans.  
Throughout history, these people have depended directly or indirectly on the forest for 
their livelihood.  The arrival of the Germans in the 1800s and the establishment of cash 
crop plantations changed the state of the tropical rain forest of the area.  An influx of 
laborers from different parts of the country, especially from the savanna and grassland 
areas and from neighboring Nigeria has reduced the amount of land available to the 
indigenous clans.  This immigration over the years has led to illegal exploitation of the 
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forest and encroachment for agricultural activities.  The establishment of the Limbe 
Botanical and Zoological Gardens (LBZG) and the Mt. Cameroon Project (MCP) in this 
area are aimed at controlling deforestation and other illegal activities in the Buea/Limbe 
region.    
The second test site is located in the Bertoua region of the East province of Cameroon.  
This region forms part of Cameroon’s southern plateau.  This region is dominated by 
evergreen and semi-deciduous forest cover.  The eastern part of this region, adjacent to 
the Central Africa Republic, is generally covered with savanna woodland and forms a 
dense network of gallery forest.  A mosaic of cultivation and tree and shrub savanna 
occupy the area in and around the town of Bertoua.  Although Bertoua is the most 
populated area in the east province of Cameroon, the province remains the least 
populated in the country.  This region is inhabited mostly by rural dwellers who depend 
largely on subsistence agriculture (slash-and-burn) and forest resources for their 
livelihood.  The construction of roads, railway lines and the opening of forest companies 
have led to increased migration into the region.  Most of the migrants come from adjacent 
communities in the Central African Republic. 
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Due to an increase in industrial, commercial and agricultural developments, as well as 
population growth, the land cover in these regions has undergone changes.  It is important 
to study these changes, understand their rate of occurrence and their effects on the most 
abundant resource of the region, the rain forest.  Understanding land use cover changes 
and their effects on forest resources in these regions will lay the ground work for 
developing a forest policy and management prototype for Cameroon. 
 
4.1.1 Why 1984 to 2000 time period?
The time period from 1984 to 2000 was chosen to carry out a land use and cover change 
detection using multi-temporal remotely sensed data (Landsat TM 1984, 1986 and ETM+ 
2000) with provincial and zone-level socio-economic data.  This time period was chosen 
for three reasons.  First, it covers at least six years following the dates of enactment of 
two major forest and land use policy eras in Cameroon (i.e. the 1976 Land Use 
Ordinances and the 1994 Forest Policy).  This is a reasonable time span to observe any 
meaningful change in land cover.  Second, the two dates are the best available in terms of 
cloud free image scenes for the two study areas.  Southern Cameroon falls within latitude 
2º and 5º north of the equator, a tropical zone that is almost always covered by thick 
clouds.  Third, there was the availability of image scenes for each study area within this 
time period that were close enough (second week of December) to be considered 
“anniversary dates.”  As Jensen (1996, 256) points out, “using anniversary date imageries 
removes seasonal sun angle and plant phonological differences that can destroy a change 
detection project.”   
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4.2 The Frame for Analysis 
 
The frame for analysis involves selecting and designing an empirical regression model to 
test the effects of ancillary activities on the physical and socio-economic environment.  
The frame for analysis in this study is three fold.  It begins with acquisition and 
interpretation of remotely sensed data.  Landsat imageries (TM and ETM+) of Cameroon 
are geo-referenced to the two study areas and land use changes for the time period 1984 
to 2000 are identified.  This is a pixel-based interpretation.  This is followed by 
qualitative modeling and setting out important frames of the problem.  First, the problem 
is modeled using factors that drive deforestation in Cameroon and second, the role of 
stake holders is examined.  Third, sources of the problem are analyzed and framed into a 
series of concept maps.  The concept maps are based on the results of a closed survey that 
was conducted in the two study areas.  Two survey methods were used in the survey: 
simple random sampling and stratified sampling.  In the simple random sampling method, 
a sample size of 40 people were randomly selected from a phone directory containing 
phone numbers of individuals living in the two study areas.  The numbers were written on 
pieces of papers and placed in a hat and picked out randomly.  The individuals were then 
contacted.  In the stratified sampling method, phone numbers of people working in forest 
related sectors were collected from different ministries (Agriculture, forestry, etc.).  
These phone numbers were grouped into strata.  Sample numbers were then drawn from 
within these strata and the individuals contacted.  This method was used so as to ensure 
that the sample was representative.  Based on outcomes of the different analysis (image 
analysis, socio-economic analysis, and analysis of important frames), goals, constraints 
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and objectives are laid out in a matrix to compare potential policy alternatives.  Finally, 





MEASUREMENT AND ESTABLISHMENT OF CHANGES IN 
FOREST COVER 
 
This chapter presents a remote sensing model used to measure the rate and degree of 
forest loss in Cameroon over a sixteen year period.  The remote sensing model is 
combined with an economic model (multivariate regression model) to estimate the 
driving forces behind forest loss in Cameroon. 
 
5.1 Space-based Change Detection  
 
Different change detection algorithms can be used in studies of this nature.  These may 
include:  write function memory insertion in which individual bands of remotely sensed 
data are inserted into a specific memory bank to visually identify change in the imagery 
(Price et al. 1992); band rationing or image differencing in which imagery of one date is 
subtracted from that of another (Green et al. 1994); and post-classification comparison 
which involves extracting the difference between two classified images of two different 
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dates (Jensen 1996).  The post-classification comparison method was used in this study. 
The following procedure was applied: 
• The Landsat data (TM1984, 1986 and ETM+ 2000) were acquired from Global Land 
Cover Facility (GLCF) (http://glcf.umiacs.umd.edu).  The image data were acquired 
in an Orthorectified format geocoded in the spheroid and datum WGS84, with map 
projections UTM33 and UTM32 for Bertoua and Buea/Limbe study areas 
respectively. 
• Band selection and combination was performed.  Each image scene consisted of 6 
band layers: 1 (blue), 2 (Green) 3 (Red) 4 (Near Infrared) 5 (Mid infrared), and 7 
(Infrared).  Band 6 (thermal band) was omitted as it was not required for this study.   
• To merge the land cover information into one image scene, the band layers were 
stacked together using the tool “Interpreter-layer stack” in ERDAS IMAGINE 9.0.  
• To further reduce processing time and create more disk space the “actual” areas being 
studied (area of interest – AOI) were clipped as a subset of the images.  Also, clipping 
and extracting subsets of the images avoids cloud-covered areas from interfering and 
distorting the analysis.  The image scenes from the Buea/Limbe study area were 
particularly problematic in this regard.   Therefore clipping subsets of the images was 
indispensable for the analysis.  
• A threshold analysis was performed at a confidence level of 0.05 with chi-square 
7.820.  This was carried out in order to determine the general change condition in the 
study areas.  The threshold change was depicted in three classes: negative change 
(vegetation loss/degradation), no change, and positive change (vegetation increase). 
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5.1.1 Land-cover land-use classification
• Four separate supervised classifications were carried out using the maximum 
likelihood classifier.  The supervised classifications were carried out on land-cover 
images for 1984 and 2000, representing date 1 and date 2 for the Bertoua study area, 
and for 1986 and 2000, representing date 1 and date 2 for the Buea/Limbe study area.  
• Training data for the classification was derived from; 1) field observations carried out 
in December of 2005; 2) by interpreting the ecological map of the vegetation cover of 
South Cameroon (National Centre for Forestry Development 1979); and 3) the 
interactive forestry map of Cameroon (Global Forest Watch 2001). 
• Using a remote sensed false color composite (FCC) raster 4, 5, 3 (near infrared, mid 
infrared and red respectively) and guided by training data, pixels from seven land-
cover classes were selected.  These classes include:  Agricultural Field_1, 
Agricultural Field_2, Forest_1, Forest_2, Water, Deep Water, and Urban/Rural Built.  
• The Agricultural Field_1 class corresponds to large expanses of cultivation land 
(plantations) characterized by shrub savanna, tree crops, palms, and broad-leaf plants.  
The Agricultural Field_2 class corresponds to grassland savanna and subsistence 
farming areas characterized by fragmented and partially covered plots with crops of 
<5m tall.  The Forest_1 class corresponds to dense and moist evergreen forest.  The 
Forest_2 class corresponds to degraded and less dense evergreen forest. The Water 
class corresponds to all inland water bodies both natural and man-made. The Deep 
Water class corresponds to sea water.  Deep Water was classified only in the 
Buea/Limbe study area, as Bertoua is in the interior.  This was to prevent the software 
from including pixels of the open sea with those of the water class which only 
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includes inland water bodies.  The Urban/Rural Built class corresponds to build 
environment such as roads, towns and villages.  Bare soil is also included in the 
urban/rural built class.  
• Due to the fact that the focus of this study is on land cover change as a whole and not 
on specific aspects of land use, Agricultural Field_1 and Agricultural Field_2 were 
merged to form a single class: Agricultural Field. Likewise, Forest_1 and Forest_2 
were merged into a single class: Forest Land.  Since Deep Water (Atlantic Ocean) 
was classified only in one study area (Buea/Limbe), it was not considered in the final 
analysis.  
• An accuracy assessment was performed on the classified land-cover maps.  Maps of 
the Bertoua study area indicated an accuracy of 90% each for the 1984 and 2000 
images while maps of the Buea/Limbe study area indicated an accuracy of 90% and 
85% for the 1986 and 2000 images respectively.   
• The classified maps were divided in to six zones (Figure 5.1 and 5.2).  The Bertoua 
study area was divided into four zones (Zone 1 - NW Bertoua, Zone 2 - NE Bertoua, 
Zone 3 - SW Bertoua, and Zone 4 - SE Bertoua) while the Buea/Limbe study area 
was divided into two zones (Zone 5 - Buea/Limbe – North and Zone 6 – Buea/Limbe 
– South).  It was not possible to follow political boundaries or specific surface area 
patterns to divide the classified maps into zones hence, the ULX-LRX and ULY-LRY 
map coordinate system for ERDAS IMAGINE 9.0 was used in the division process to 
prevent pixel data of other zones from overlapping.  The reason for dividing the 
classified maps into zones was to increase the number of observations necessary for 
multivariate regression modeling.  
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Zone 1                                                                                                                Zone 2 
NW Bertoua                                                                                                       NE Bertoua 
 
Zone 3                                                                                                               Zone 4
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Bertoua Study Area 
 










Urban/Rural Built  
Figure 5.1: Land use cover of the Bertoua study area (zones 1-4):  date 1 (1984) 
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 Study Area  
 










Urban/Rural Built  
Figure 5.2: Land use cover of the Buea/Limbe study area (zones 5 and 6):  date 1 
(1986) 
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Urban/Rural Built  
Figure 5.3: Land use cover of the Bertoua study area (zones 1-4):  date 2 (2000) 
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Urban/Rural Built  
Figure 5.4: Land use cover of the Buea/Limbe study area (zones 5 and 6):  date 2 
(2000) 
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5.2 Change Detection Results 
The above processing procedures led to a pool of change data (Appendix I) that was 
processed to determine changes that occurred in each of the six zones.  Below (table 5.1) 
is a summary of the change data for the six zones.  The positive and negative signs 
accompanying numbers in the table indicate increase and decrease change respectively 
for the different land uses.  
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Zone 1 (NW 
Bertoua) 
121.87 +9.60 -6.17 +3.12 +6.56 
Zone 2 (NE 
Bertoua) 
104.17 +4.29 -1.14 +0.99 -4.17 
Zone 3 (SW 
Bertoua) 
74.89 -12.29 +14.49 +0.52 -2.71 
Zone 4 (SE 
Bertoua) 




















Proportion in the total 
territory (%) 
7.51 7.09 2.04 4.03 
Km²/yr 2.09 1.97 0.57 1.12 Annual 
change rate  
% 1.29 0.87 4.78 2.52 
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5.3 Discussions 
Analysis of the change data indicates that 20.67% of the total territory had changed in 16 
years (1984 to 2000).  Noticeable are changes (increase and decrease) in Agricultural 
Field and Forest Land (33.42 and 31.54 Km² or 7.51% and 7.09% in area respectively). 
Within this time period, Agricultural Field changed at a rate of 2.09 Km²/yr or 1.29% 
while Forest Land changed at a rate of 1.97 Km²/yr or 0.87%.  All zones registered an 
increase in Agricultural Field except for zone 3 – SW Bertoua.  Unlike the Agricultural 
Field class, the Forest Land class decreased in all zones but for zones 3 – SW Bertoua 
that showed an increase.  Overall, the Agricultural Field class increased by 21.13 Km² 
whiles the Forest Land class decreased by 17.05 Km².  Due to the fact that increase in 
Agricultural Field and decrease in Forest Land occurred in the same zone (SW Bertoua), 
and given that the change is almost of the same proportion (12.29 and 14.49 Km² 
respectively), it is logical to conclude that forest loss is driven primarily by the quest for 
farm land.  
 
The analysis also showed changes in the Urban/Rural Built class.  Urban and rural built 
environments are generally expected to increase over time with an increase in the 
population of a given locality.  In this study, within a period of 16 years, 17.92 Km² of 
the Urban/Rural Built class changed (increase and decrease) at a rate of 1.12 Km²/yr or 
2.52%.  Three of the six zones (NW Bertoua, SE Bertoua and Buea/Limbe - South) 
showed an increase in their Urban/Rural Built class while the other three zones (NE 
Bertoua, SW Bertoua and Buea/Limbe - North) showed a decrease (see Appendix I).  
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Though it is a 50/50 change in terms of the number of zones (i.e. three zones experienced 
an increase and three zones experienced a decrease), an increase in urban/rural built 
environment in NW – Bertoua, SE – Bertoua and Buea/Limbe - South, led to an overall 
increase of 1.63 Km².  
 
The Water Body class indicated that 9.07 Km² changed (increase and decrease) in 16 
years at a rate of 0.57 Km²/yr or 4.74%.  There was an increase of water in all but one 
zone (Limbe/Buea South), leading to an overall increase change of 8.2 Km².  The 
availability of surface water is often influenced by the availability of trees.  Given that 
there is an overall decrease in forest (17.05 Km²); the overall increase in water bodies can 
only be attributed to man-made lakes, ponds, swimming pools or flood water.  But, it is 
unlikely that the increase was as a result of flooding because the landsat images were 
taken in the month of December, which is the dry season.  
 
5.4 Panel Analysis: A Multivariate Regression Modeling 
It is important to determine changes that occur in our environment but it is even more 
important to understand the forces behind these changes.  Socio-economic activities have 
been identified as the main forces behind global environmental change (IGBP 1999).  
Therefore, socio-economic data of the Bertoua and Limbe/Buea study areas are linked 
with the results of changes observed from the imagery, to determine how they influence 
land use in these areas.  This can be done by employing a multidimensional statistical 
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regression model (Panel analysis) to determine the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables.  That is, to determine if there is a statistically significant 
correlation between the independent and dependent variables in the analysis, and how 
much of the variation is explained by these variables.  Based on the regression equations, 
a proportion of estimates of future impacts of social and economic conditions on land use 
in the study areas are made.  The panel analysis for this study is modeled after Kleinbaum 
et al (1998), Lambin (1994), and Wu et al. (2001).  The model is mathematically 
expressed as follows: 
Y = βo + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 +? + βnXn + E............................................………….. (1) 
Where : 
Y = is the dependent variable.  That is, change(s) that occurred in the study areas from 
1984 to 2000.  The four land use categories examined in the change detection phase 
were used as the dependent variables.  These include:  
• Agricultural Field;  
• Forest Land; 
• Water Body; and 
• Urban/Rural Built. 
Xn = are the independent variables.  That is, potential causes or human forces that might 
have brought about changes in the land cover.   Five independent variables are 
examined: 
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• Total population; 
• Urban population; 
• Rural population; 
• Agricultural output and; 
• Income per capita; 
Due to the limited number of observations (six), all five independent variables 
could not be examined at once as that would limit the degree of freedom vis-à-vis 
the dependent and independent variables.  Hence, the model was run four times 
(multiple regression), each time with a different independent variable.  
β0 = is a constant or intercept; 
 βn = are regression coefficients; and 
E = is the error component. 




















ZONE 1 4.7 2.9 1.8 81 570 
ZONE 2 2.9 1.8 1.1 76 565 
ZONE 3       7.2 1.0 6.2 35 524 
ZONE 4 2.1 0.3 1.8 73 562 
ZONE 5 5.8 3.6 2.2 77 566 
ZONE 6 4.1 2.5 1.5 72 561 
The independent variable data was drawn from different sources including Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) database at http://foastat.foa.org; the World Bank’s 
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World Development Indicators database at http://devdata.worldbank.org; Country 
Statistics database at http://www.statoids.com/ycm.html; and from Cameroon’s Annual 
Report of Provincial Statistical Service.  Since the zones within the study areas do not 
correspond with political boundaries, calculations for the variables were made based on 
data at the divisional, provincial and national levels.  Multivariate software, SAS, was 
used for the analysis (see Appendix II).  Results of the analysis are summarized in table 
5.3 below.  

















































0.92 +0.44933 0.48815 1 0.85 0.4094 0.1748 
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5.5 Discussions  
 
With the available change detection data and panel analysis results it is possible to make 
projections on the different land use activities and determine how each activity affects the 
environment.  With these results the future of land use change mechanisms examined in 
this study can be projected as follows: 
• An increase in agricultural field is the most significant change in the landscape of the 
study areas.  This increase in agricultural field is also reflected by the increase in 
agricultural output.  According to the regression modeling, an increase in agricultural 
field has a significant difference on the agricultural output increase (R² = 0.7512).  
This correlation is not surprising given the high rate of immigration in these areas, 
especially in the Bertoua area which has one of the highest (31.9%) in the country 
(Pokam and Sunderlin 1999).  Most people move into these areas, looking for jobs in 
the logging sector.  But because most of the immigrants are unskilled, they can not 
earn enough income to support their families hence, they have to engage in slash-and-
burn agriculture which, in effect, increases cultivated land and pushes up agricultural 
output.  The relationship between an increase in rural population, increase in 
agricultural output and increase in agricultural field can be expressed as follow: 
[Increase in Agricultural Field] = 1.65 + 0.44088 [Increase in Rural 
Population] + 5.61323 [Increase in Agricultural Output] ……………... (2)      
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If agricultural field continues to change at the rate of 2.09 Km²/yr or 1.29% (1.32 Km²/yr 
increase), it will mean that an additional 18.48 Km² of land will be converted to 
agricultural land by the year 2020.  Given that slash-and-burn is the main farming method 
in these areas, it is likely that the 18.48 Km² will be gained from forest land.      
• A decrease in forest land is the second most significant change on these landscapes. 
Modeling this change, panel analysis shows that a decrease in forest land is associated 
with an increase in rural population and low income per capita (R² = 0.9892). This 
association is expressed as: 
[Decrease in Forest Land] = 5.53 + 0.33662 [Increase in Rural Population] 
+ 5.45751 [Low Income Per Capita]…………………………………… (3) 
With very little rural investment in these areas, the high rate of rural population, 
especially in the Bertoua area (70.1%), has led to competition for resources.  Left only 
with an option of subsistent farming, hunting and small scale fishing, and the average 
income per person in these areas is so low (USD 5.70) that they have to encroach on the 
forest to augment their living standard.  Industrial and illegal logging activities in these 
areas have led to a decrease in forest land of about 17.05 Km² or 1.06 Km²/yr.  At this 
reduction rate, an additional 14.84 Km² of forest land will be lost by the year 2020. 
• The urban/rural built environment has also brought changes in the Buea/Limbe and 
Bertoua regions.  Compared to changes in agricultural field and forest land, changes 
brought about by urban/rural built were not very significant.  A total of 17.92 Km² 
urban/rural lands had changed (increase and decrease) in 16 years.  But urban/rural 
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built had only increased by 1.63 Km² in 16 years (0.10 Km²/yr).  From a socio-
economic stand point, a regression model ties this increase to an increase in total 
population (R² = 0.4094) of the two study areas.  Their link can be expressed as: 
[Increase in Urban/Rural Built] = 0.92 + 0.44933 [Increase in Total 
Population]……………………………………………………………. (4)      
Growing at a rate of 0.10 Km²/yr may appear insignificant, but a projection through the 
year 2020 indicates that an additional 1.42 Km² of forest land will be converted to 
urban/rural land.  
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Mathematically, by the year 2020 a total of 34.74 Km² of forest land in the two study 
areas will be lost to agricultural and urban/rural expansion or simply left as “open fields” 
prone to different forms of degradation.  This means that the 224.31 Km² (2000 estimate) 
of forest land in the Buea/Limbe and Bertoua regions will be reduced to 134.46 Km² by 
the year 2050.  If such a loss occurs in the entire forest region of Cameroon, it is possible 
for the nation to lose more than half of its 22 million hectares of rain forest by 2050 if the 





CORRELATION OF CHANGES IN FOREST COVER WITH 
NATURAL RESOURCE POLICIES 
 
In the last chapter a remote sensing model was used to measure the rate and degree of 
forest loss in Cameroon over a sixteen years period.  The remote sensing model was 
combined with an economic model to determine the driving forces behind forest loss in 
Cameroon. Haven determined the degree, rate, and forces driving forest loss in 
Cameroon, this chapter will now correlate this loss to failed and inadequate policies.  The 
chapter discusses how policy issues since independence (1961), particularly between 
1984 and 2000, has directly or indirectly brought about changes in Cameroon’s forest 
cover.  The chapter shows how intricacies of the global market place and the 
complexities of the political, economic, and social conditions in Cameroon and the world 
have contributed to the country’s forest loss.  The chapter also explores the 
heterogeneous nature of stake holders and the role they play in the socio-economic and 
political setup of Cameroon’s forest sector.  The chapter begins with a very significant 
issue that is peculiar to most tropical timber exporting nations; the problem of market 
70
failure.  This is followed by a discussion of controversies in the forestry taxation system.  
The chapter continues with discussions on issues of policy failures and weaknesses, 
institutional weaknesses, foreign debt, population growth, and influences of forest loss.  
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the role of different stakeholders in 
Cameroon’s forest sector. 
 
6.1 Market Failures 
 
Many services (mostly environmental services) provided by the forest are not traded in 
markets and, as a result we have not established markets based on prices and therefore do 
not enter into the decisions of private and public sector actors (Pearce and Warford 
(1993).  For example, the government of Cameroon is the country’s land owner who has 
the responsibility of maintaining lands under forest cover, but because the government 
does not get the full value of social benefits provided by forest, there is little or no 
incentive to protect the forest and the underlying lands.  The market has failed to 
stimulate the government and the private sector in the direction of socially based 
objectives.  This causes the government to misplace its priorities, hence, ushering in 
inefficiencies that lead to forest decline and, consequently, forest loss.  
 
6.1.1 Lack of information on the Value of Non-market Benefits
Lack of information regarding the value of non-market benefits of forest is the reason for 
market failure (Pearce and Warford 1993; Pearce 2001).  For example, non-market goods 
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such as biodiversity, watershed protection, recreation, and carbon sequestration appear to 
be of low importance to the government and to the local population as well (Fomété 
2001).  It is clear that the failure of markets to capture the value of non-priced services of 
the forest is an indirect but meaningful cause of forest loss that shapes the non 
conservation attitude of forest exploiters in Cameroon.   
 
6.1.2 Low Concession Charges
Charges paid by timber concessionaires are relatively low compared to the market value 
of the resource (Fomété 2001).  These low charges have encouraged foreign timber 
companies (especially French companies) to aggressively seek concessions in 
Cameroon’s forests.   There is also the lack of incentive for long term management due to 
logging competition among the many concessionaires.  High profits due to low charges 
are also potential drivers of corruption that has handicapped strict enforcement of 
concession terms.  Some of these market pricing systems already exist (Fomété 2001) but 
are poorly implemented or enforced due to lack of inventory equipment to calculate the 
fees.  So, the acquisition of the necessary tool to do the accounting is vital for proper 
market pricing.  Market mechanisms should also be used to give out concessions with 
strong ingredients such as supervision management and tenure of concession.  Proper 
pricing can generate revenue that can be further used to better manage and protect the 
forest.   
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6.1.3 Lack of Well Defined Forest Property Rights
Although the government of Cameroon appropriates forest lands and all its resources, the 
local population regards it as theirs (Vabi and Sikod 2000).  This is a problem because 
this means that forest property rights are not well defined (Amin 1999).  In the absence of 
well defined property rights (complete specification of rights, exclusive ownership, 
transferability, and enforceability) the forest becomes a “common property” (Hardin 
2000).  According to Hardin, the use of common property leads to externalities (“tragedy 
of the common”) as no one is liable for the cost of the externalities.  Hardin argues that 
the solution to such a problem depends upon “mutually agreed upon coercion.”  In this 
situation therefore, it is important that property rights in Cameroon are properly defined 
(i.e. giving land ownership to individuals and communities) and enforced so as to better 
manage the forest.  Simply declaring all forest as belonging to the state is not a wise 
approach as this has instead accelerated the exploitation and degradation of the forest.  
Coercion must be entered in a way that all parties with stakes must be willing to accept 
the rules and regulation that limit their access and yet protects the forest and the services 
that it provides. 
 
6.2 Forestry Taxation Controversies 
 
Poor or mistaken tax policies have created obstacles to the sustainable management of 
forests in Cameroon (Sikod et al. 1996).  In an effort to resolve the issue of market 
failure, the government under the 1994 forest policy embarked on reforming the forestry 
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taxation system, output targets, regulation, private incentives and macroeconomic 
management.  These policy interventions have instead created more controversies which 
have contributed to deforestation.  This section focuses on two controversial issues - the 
forestry taxation system, and the involvement of local communities in managing and 
sharing the benefits from the exploitation of forest resources.  These two controversies 
emanate from one of three objectives of the current forest policy – “the creation and 
equitable distribution of the revenue generated.”  
 
6.2.1 Forestry Taxation Modalities
The forestry taxation system under the 1994 Forestry Law recognizes two forest statuses; 
the Permanent Forest Estate and the Non-Permanent Forest Estate.  Forest areas under the 
Permanent Forest Estate status belong to the state.  All permanent forest areas are 
managed by local councils under the supervision of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forest (MINEF).  Concessions under this status are divided into Forest Management 
Units (FMUs).  The Non-Permanent Forest Estate, on the other hand, belongs to private 
individuals and communities.  Concessions under this status are allocated for areas up to 
2,500 ha, known as Sales of Standing Volume (SSV). 
 
The main tax regulations contained in the 1994 Forestry Law are as follows: 
• The Royalty for the Forest Area (RFA).  Royalties are “rents” not “taxes,” but are 
placed under tax regulations to ensure that concessionaires pay for the right to access 
the resource.  RFA rates are determined on the basis of a base rate, valid for a 
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temporal period of 3 years.  If all conditions are met during this time, a 15 year 
license, which is renewable once, is granted.  The current RFA rate is FCFA 
1,500/ha/year (approximately US$ 3.00) (Fomété 2001);  
• The Felling Tax (FT).  This regulation aims to eliminate wastage at the point of 
felling and to check the actual level of logging in the forest (Fomété 2001); 
• Exit (export) duty on logs; 
• Factory Taxes (exit duty on sawn products and entry taxes on logs taken into 
factories). 
 
6.2.2 Decentralization of Forestry Taxation System
A major renovation of the new policy is decentralization of forestry taxation.  Unlike in 
the old law where all forest revenues were controlled by the central government, the 1994 
law introduced two instruments that empower local governments to manage revenues 
from their forest resources.  These two instruments are the share of the RFA, and the 
‘FCFA 1000 tax’.  The share of the RFA instrument divides total forest revenues in a 
ratio of 50:40:10. That is, 50% for the state, 40% for the local council, and 10% for 
communities neighboring the forest area.  The ‘FCFA 1000 tax’ is a charge levied on 
holders of the SSV permit for every 1 cubic meter of timber logged.  The revenue is 
earmarked for social projects like roads, schools, and hospital in the affected 
communities.  This form of decentralized taxation could be a vital “wind-fall” for the 
councils as their regular annual grants never meet up with the local needs.  For the forest 
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communities, it is more than just a “wind-fall” as they were virtually left out of the 
picture under the old law.   
 
Although beneficial, decentralized taxation does not favor non forest communities. 
Geographically, the south, central, and eastern provinces of the country are getting more 
than 70% of the tax revenue, while the reminding seven provinces get less than 30% 
(Formété 2001).  Apart from the geographic inequality, the decentralized taxation system 
does not lay out concrete modalities for the handling of tax revenues.  Like its 
predecessor, the policy remains vulnerable to fraud, evasion, and misappropriation.  For 
example, in his evaluation of the current management of forestry revenue, Fomété (2001) 
points to the fact that the ‘FCFA 1000 tax’ is rarely distributed as stated in the loggers’ 
condition of contract.  Logging companies have taken advantage of the weak modalities 
to benefit from the system by making only partial payments to the council and direct 
contributions in kind to the villagers.  In some cases, powerful elites have made deals 
with loggers that benefit only them and not the community.  In such cases, the council 
and the local population do not get the social benefits (roads, schools, hospital etc) as 
stipulated in the conditions of contract.  From all indication, the ‘FCFA 1000 tax’ policy 
has turned out to be an official “bribe” for the local populations. 
 
Due to the fact that the ‘FCFA 1000 tax’ instrument is applicable only to the SSV in the 
non-permanent forest estate, boundary problems are eminent.  This is because the larger 
the non-permanent forest estate, the more benefit the local population gets from it. 
Boundary problems are particularly challenging to authorities due to lack of consensus 
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between all stakeholders.  Developed without any proper consultations with the local 
populations, the community forest management provision of the new law has 
compounded the boundary problem.  Some provisions are vague and lack legislative 
clarity.  These problems delayed kick-off of the community forest management program, 
with not even a single community forest being allocated as of April 1998 (Lescuyer et al 
1999).  Local populations only began to comprehend the management program when the 
“manual of the procedures for the attribution, and norms for the management of 
community forests” was published in April of 1998.  As for the boundary problem, a 
technical solution is being sought.  Thanks to the help of the Tropenbos Cameroon 
Program (partnership between the Tropenbos Foundation/University of Wageningen in 
the Netherlands, and MINEF and MINREST in Cameroon); the problem is being 
resolved by the use of GIS tools.  Based on the Cameroon national zoning plan, the 
Tropenbos Cameroon Programme (TCP) proposed the demarcation and management of 
permanent forest around the country (Lescuyer et al 1999).    
 
Another problem with the decentralized taxation system is lack of transparency.  There is 
little or no flow of information between the different stakeholders. Most forest 
inhabitants in Cameroon are illiterate.  The few who can barely read and write find it 
difficult to interpret policy documents.  This is a huge limitation which, coupled with the 
lack of adequate information to estimate their expected revenue, causes inhabitants to fall 
prey to the greedy loggers.  Forest communities and other stakeholders should be 
educated on the provisions and procedure of the new law.  This will help all players to 
work collectively towards attaining the goals of the new law.  The decentralized taxation 
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system is a “bitter-sweet” pill as it does not benefit some local communities in the 
country.  The geographic inequality that puts some council at the disadvantage can be 
neutralized by creating a special grant fund for non-forest councils in the country.  This 
fund should come from the 50% state share of the RFA tax.  
 
Although a decentralized forestry taxation system is now in effect in Cameroon, the 
government still places strong emphasis on centralized decision-making, ownership and 
control of forest resources.  This has caused the local population not to cooperate with the 
government in managing the forest.  These centralized decision-making policies have 
been partly responsible for failures to protect forests and for its extensive loss. 
 
6.3 Policy Failures and Weakness 
 
The government has failed to take into consideration the side effects of some of its 
policies.  For example, road construction has been undertaken by the government mainly 
for development and security reasons.  Much of the county’s laws with regards to forest 
and land use and management decisions are strongly influenced by these broader 
development objectives.  For example, road networks provide access to the forest hence, 
construction of a new road, whether it is by a logging company or as part of a national 
development plan, is an integral part of deforestation that leads to forest loss (Reppeto 
1993).  For example, The PERFED II road program initiated and funded by the European 
Union has 20% of the road network passing through the country’s rain forest (ADB 
1995).  The government failed to realize that the construction of roads near or through the 
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forest leads to deforestation.  It could as well be that the reason for constructing the road 
in the first place is undermined by the desire for logging by small business individuals, 
backed by some politically powerful groups that are able to influence government 
policies and not the other way around.  The best policy in this situation would be to 
undertake reforms on road construction policies that would curb the negative incentives 
for unsustainable practices.  
 
6.3.1 Subsidy Policy
Another failure is in subsidy policy.  Studies by Kummer (1991), Gray (1997), Wilkinson 
(1998) and Kartodiharjo and Supriona (2000) indicate that large portions of tropical 
forests are under concessions due to government subsidy policies.  The government of 
Cameroon gives subsidies either directly to private companies in the forest sector or 
indirectly to entrepreneurs in other sectors related to the forest sector.   For example, 
subsidies granted to farmers have unintentionally led to the decline and loss of the 
nation’s forest.   With increased financial resources not directly generated from their 
existing lands, farmers would want to expand their land.  Most often, expansion occurs in 
forested lands.  Similarly, plantation agriculture has led to the clearing of large forest 
lands.  For example, since 1991, the Cameroon Development Corporation has had 
plantation expansion of up to 10,000 hectares (Acworth et al 2001).  This is mainly due 
to subsidized farm machineries and inputs that facilitate large scale production.  This also 
forces smaller farmers, who do not have the means to acquire machinery, to invade 
forested areas and practice slash-and-burn farming.   A remedy to this particular problem 
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is for subsidies to be codified with policies that require beneficiaries to carry out 
agricultural intensification rather than agricultural extensification that leads to forest loss.  
 
6.3.2 Oil and Natural Gas Exploitation Policy 
Policy decisions to exploit oil and natural gas in the sensitive Limbe coastal forest area is 
another cause to the loss of the country’s forest.  Since this policy was adopted about 
three decades ago, the coastal rainforest of Cameroon has suffered extensive loss due to 
the construction of an oil refinery in the Limbe neighborhood.  The loss is also 
compounded by the fact that the oil field is located in the coastal division of Ndian which 
is about 50Km (31 mile) from the refinery site in Limbe.  This meant that a road had to 
be constructed through the dense forest of Ndian division to facilitate the transportation 
of crude oil and natural gas to the refinery site in Limbe.  The government’s decision to 
allow the landlocked nation of Chad to export its oil through the port of Kribi has also led 
to the loss of Cameroon’s forest.  The laying of oil pipe lines from the oil field in Doba in 
southern Chad to the port of Kribi in the south of Cameroon (over 1,070 km i.e. 665 mile) 
is responsible for the loss of over 15 km² of rainforest (CED 2004).  Another potential 
loss of forest under Cameroon’s oil exploitation policy could come from the disputed oil 
rich Bakassi peninsula, which officially belongs to Cameroon following the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (IRIN Africa 2006).   The Bakassi peninsula is an 
extension of the Buea/ Limbe forest region between Cameroon and Nigeria. 
 
80
6.4 Institutional Weaknesses 
 
The forest sector of Cameroon is managed by many government ministries and agencies. 
Policy officials of the forest sector come from a number of ministries.  In addition to 
representatives from the legislative and executive branches of the government, a total of 
nine governmental institutions are involved in policy making and implementation in the 
forest sector.  These include the Presidency of the Republic, Office of the Prime Minister, 
the National Assembly (parliament), the Ministry of Environment and Forest, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Public Investment and 
Regional Planning, the Ministry of Industrial and Commercial Development, and the 
Office of Forest Development (ONADEF).  With each policy official’s role not clearly 
defined, too often there is conflict of interest among these officials.  This often leads to 
bureaucracy which stifles effective decision-making leaving forest officials in the field 
with no concrete rules to enforce (Ekoko 1999).   
 
In addition to this bureaucratic debacle is the absence of a strong and independent legal 
system to support the collection of revenues from the forest sector.  The Ministry of 
Environment and Forest that is supposed to be the principal Ministry responsible for 
implementing forest policies is being incapacitated by influences from the Presidency and 
the Prime Minister’s Office. Key personnel in these Ministries and agencies have little or 
no technical knowledge in sustainable forest management as their appointments are 
mainly political and not based on professional qualifications (Ekoko 1999).  The “man-
know-man” game (network connection), where by family, ethnic, and political ties are 
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used as a tool for recruiting personnel is endemic in the forest sector.  The problem of 
incompetent personnel has led to poor governance and corruption in the sector.  For 
example, a policy under the 1974 Forest Ordinances and Laws required the 
demonstration of use of public land to affirm legal property right over those lands led to 
land tenure.  To demonstrate land use, the local population has engaged in deforesting 
public lands (Vabi and Sikod 2000).  Officials are also being bribed to award private 
property rights on public lands. Also, in an effort to compensate small farmers displaced 
by large agribusiness entrepreneurs, the government decided to fragment and distribute 
publicly owned land (mostly forest land) to landless farmers (Vabi and Sikod 2000).  The 
result of this institutional/policy weakness is overnight growth of “squatters” in public 
forest lands. 
 
These entanglements between politics, personal interest and governance issues have led 
to a care free attitude amongst officials of the forest sector as there is lack of effective 
coordination of the many institutions involved in the sector.  To resolve these institutional 
problems, the Ministry of the Environment and Forest must be independent from the 
Presidency and the Prime minister’s Office when it comes to areas of technicality and 
policy design.  Motivation of government employees through salary increase could also 
reduce if not eliminate corruption.  Capacity building by structuring the different 




6.5 The Issue of Foreign Debt 
 
As indicated in a study of 68 countries over a four year period (1981 to 1985) Khan and 
McDonald (1995) argue that debt service has a negative influence on forest management.  
External pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) to 
recover debts owed them by the government of Cameroon has left the nation’s forest 
vulnerable.  Forest policies in Cameroon are being influenced by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, mainly through the Structural Adjustment Plans (SAP) that 
favor longer durations of concessions to logging companies, and encourage large forest 
areas for concessions (Ekoko 1997).  Other elements of the Structural Adjustment Plan 
policies implemented in Cameroon include: correction of fiscal imbalances mainly 
through reduction in public expenditure, reduction of the role of the state in managing the 
economy, promotion of privatization, removal of obstacles to international capital flows 
and to the formation and expansion of national capital markets, liberalization of exchange 
policies, removal of restrictive trade policies, and deregulation of labor markets 
(Kamanda 1995).  The International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Plan 
program required the Cameroon government to cut back on public spending.  This caused 
the government to reduce employment by 5,500 between 1995 and 1997 (Ekoko 1997).   
This move left the unemployed with no option but to turn to illegal logging and slash-
and-burn farming to support their families.  The implementation of Structural Adjustment 
Programs, coupled with the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, led to a severe 
shortage of financial and human resources to manage and protect the country’s forest.  
Most structural adjustment policies prescribed by the International Monetary Fund are 
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meant to liberalize the economies of countries adopting them and open up their markets 
to global economy.   Instead, it has presented mixed fortunes for developing countries.  
Since its inception only a few countries like China, Brazil and Indonesia have been able 
to get meaningful benefits from the program.  The rest of the developing countries have 
instead witnessed economic downturns (Brown and Quiblier 1994).  In Cameroon, 
reduction in public spending has instead led to unemployment forcing people to rely on 
subsistence farming at the detriment of the forest.  The International Monetary Fund’s 
call for economic liberalization has not yielded much for Cameroon as the nation’s 
foreign direct investments (FDI) remains low (31.4 million US dollar 2000 rate) and its 
economy remains low.  Cameroon’s foreign direct investments are mostly in the natural 
resource sector, notably in forestry, oil and cash crops.  These are investments that are 
aimed at developed country markets and do very little to improve the lives of 
Cameroonians, but hurt their environment severely.   
 
Cameroon’s high external debt value and low per capita income has also been a drawback 
for the country’s forest sector.  According to the World Bank (2006), Cameroon’s total 
external debt in 2000 was estimated at US$ 6.3 billion while its per capita income was 
US$ 570.0.  High external dept and low per capita income has ushered in unfavorable 
terms of trade mostly on agricultural products (cash crops) and natural resources like 
wood.  
 
These policies have indirectly led to forest loss because they have induced unemployment 
and poverty that force people to ravage the forest in efforts to support their families.  
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These policies have also stimulated agricultural export at the expense of forested land.  
Structural Adjustment Plan programs can lead to positive outcomes if well implemented.  
A policy that enables integrated implementation of the program and cooperates with 
national and international economies would break the chain of activities that leads to 
forest loss.  Also, instead of simply canceling Cameroon’s hard-currency debt as 
proposed by leaders of the G-8 nations, ecologist Thomas Lovejoy’s “debt-for-nature 
swap” financing strategy could be adopted.  In the debt-for-nature strategy, part of a 
nation’s debt is cancelled in exchange for the nation investing the remainder into 
conservation.  This strategy, which has been very successful in Latin America, can as 
well succeed in Cameroon which faces similar socio-economic and environmental 
conditions.    
 
6.6 Population Growth  
 
Like many other natural resources, forest loss in Cameroon has been linked to population 
pressure.  As supported by results of the change detection and socioeconomic analysis in 
chapter 5, an increase in population has increased the demand for land to cultivate and 
fuel wood for energy.  Also, an increase in population has given rise to cheap labor and 
generated high profits for agribusiness owners, making them more viable and having the 
desire for more land to expand their business.  In the same light, an increase in population 
means more mouths to feed hence, expansion in agribusiness to meet the food demands 
of the population.  An increase in population also leads to poverty as too many people 
turn to depend on few individuals for support.  Increased poverty has caused many 
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families to depend totally on the forest for survival, through logging and slash-and-burn 
farming.  The problem of population pressure is not only within the country.  The 
pressure is also coming from outside the country.  Economic growth and excessive 
foreign consumption of tropical produce like banana, cocoa, rubber, and palm nuts adds 
to the pressure.  Cameroon has responded to this increase in demand by adopting policies 
that support agricultural extensification hence, expanding its area of cultivation at the 
expense of the forest.  For example, since 1991, the Cameroon Development Corporation 
has expanded about 1,340 hectares of its plantations into the Onge-Mokoko forests in the 
Sourhwest province of Cameroon (Acworth et al 2001). 
 
In all, a combination of political pressures to accelerate harvesting, corruption, the 
weakness of government forest administration, inappropriate concession license 
allocation and timber taxation systems, and the negative impacts of macro economic 
trade, population pressure, and Structural Adjustment Program polices have led to 
decades of unsustainable forest management in Cameroon.   
 
6.7 A Conceptual Frame of Influences of Forest Loss 
 
The aforementioned direct and indirect causes link up in chain reactions that result in 
forest loss as the end link or node.  Figure 6.1 below is a conceptual framework 
(influence diagram) of these direct and indirect causes of forest loss in Cameroon. 
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6.7.1 Explanation of the Influence Scenario
Although the influence diagram appears to show some agents as directly linked to 
deforestation, there is actually no clear cut separation of direct and indirect causes of 
deforestation.  In reality, forest loss is the result of long chains of causation that are not 
linear, but have feedback loops at some points or stages in the causation chains (Angelsen 
and Culas 1996).  The links between agents and the extent of their influences among each 
other can be explained by the following scenario: Forest loss occurs in Cameroon 
because of deforestation.  Deforestation happens because local people are continuously 
expanding and/or acquiring new plots.  A family expands’ or gets a new plot because the 
current plot is no longer fertile hence they have to keep on shifting every few years.  This 
is because when they shift, they “slash-and-burn” because they believe it make the soil 
more fertile.  Shifting cultivators, “slash-and-burn” (deforest) because they need to 
provide a means of survival for their families.  This is because they are poor.  They are 
poor because the present power structure discriminates against a majority of the people 
who have little or no means of survival.  They are also poor because their families are too 
large, making it difficult to support.  Agribusiness is a side chain of agricultural 
expansion undertaken by large multinational corporations (MNCs) involved in plantation 
agriculture.  Agribusiness is due to excessive foreign consumption. 
 
In another chain of causation, a high rate of logging occurs because there are too many 
(about 600) timber corporations in Cameroon.  This is because of the weak conditions for 
obtaining forest exploitation licenses.  This is due to wrong incentives that act as a pull 
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factor for timber investors.  This is because of International Monetary Fund conditions 
that put pressure on the government to encourage investors in the forest sector of the 
economy.  A side chain or “off loop” of wrong incentives is market and policy failures.  
This is because of corruption, institutional weakness and incompetent personnel, and 
poor governance.  Also, at the rudimentary level, logging occurs because of the need for 
wood as fuel.  This is because of lack of other sources of fuel, which is as a result of 
energy policy failure.  The laying of oil pipelines is another chain node of causation.  
Two major oil pipelines traverse the Cameroon rain forest.  These were influenced by a 
shift in government investment from the agricultural sector to the oil sector in the early 
1980s when oil was discovered in the gulf region (Limbe) of the country.  This shift was 
due to changes in economic and political powers in the country.  This is because of 
increased demand for oil, mostly by western nations.  
 
The last chain of causation is road construction.  This chain has some feedback loops.  
Road construction is influenced by security needs, the need for forest exploitation by 
timber corporations, and by land occupation for agribusiness by multinational 
corporations (MNCs).  Land occupation leads to building of more roads and further 
occupation of forested land in a circular self-reinforcing loop of cause and effect 
relationship.   
 
89
6.8 The Role of Stakeholders   
 
In recent years the forest sector of Cameroon has witnessed a swelling in the number of 
groups with stakes in the country’s forest.  The newest of these groups are Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), whose involvements have steadily increased in the 
last decade.  International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) are also a 
significant group whose number and activities is also in the rise as the country continues 
to open up to the rest of the world.  Similar to International Non-Governmental 
Organizations are multilateral and bilateral partners.  These partners, together with the 
government of Cameroon, play different roles in shaping Cameroon’s forest policies, 
either by direct involvement with the forest sector or indirect involvement with sectors 
linked to the forest sector.  Local population and logging companies also play an 
influential role. 
 
6.8.1 Multilateral Partners’ Stakes
The most prominent of the multilateral partners is the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  World Bank’s involvement in the forest sector of 
Cameroon can be traced back to the 1970s when it first granted loans to the government 
of Cameroon to boost forest projects and improve on the transportation of log for export 
(Ekoko 1999).  This involvement continued to grow throughout the 1970s and 80s, not 
only financially, but technically as well.  The most notable involvement is in the drafting 
of a proposed forest reform aimed at modifying the tax structure in the forest sector 
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(Ferrer 1996).  According to Ferrer, under the 1994 World Bank proposed forest reform, 
the value of the log which is the base for taxation should be index-linked to the FOB 
price of the log rather than set administratively.  This proposal by the World Bank is also 
in line with its sister institution, the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment 
program condition, to encourage the government to reduce export taxes on forest 
products in an effort to diversify the economy and stimulate export production on the non 
oil sector (Ferrer 1996).  
 
While the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund see their role in the forest 
sector of Cameroon as an advisory one, the government of Cameroon, local members of 
the public and some academicians see it differently.  They argue that the intention of 
these two multilateral partners is nothing but a plot to hijack the county’s forest and 
secure higher revenue for the government that will enable the payment of its debts 
(Tchoungui et al. 1995).  On the other hand, some law makers (members of parliament 
MPs) and officials of the Ministry of Environment and Forest think the World Bank and 
the IMF are simply trying to impose on the government (Ekoko 1997).  Whether the 
intension of these two bodies is to advise the government of Cameroon on how to 
manage its forest resources for the benefit of its people, or to secure higher revenue to 
ensure the repayment of loans, one thing is clear; these two bodies are major actors in the 
forest sector of Cameroon and will continue to influence fundamental principles guiding 
natural resource management as long as Cameroon remains a signatory to this bodies.  
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Apart from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, three prominent 
multilateral partners are involved in the forest sector of Cameroon.  They are: the United 
Nation Development Program (UNDP), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 
and the European Union (EU).  The UNDP and the FAO have been involved in forest 
projects in the country since the mid 1960s following the country’s independence from 
France in 1961.  The European Union on the other hand has been involved in the 
country’s forest sector since the mid-1970s.  Among its numerous projects is funding of 
the ECOFAC project in the Dja reserve which lies south of the Bertoua study area.  The 
Dja reservation is also a Biosphere Reserve under UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere 
Program and is a World Heritage Site.  According to the Ministry of the Environment 
and Forest, the stakes of these three partners are in the promotion of a Tropical Forest 
Action Plan (TFAP) that was initiated in the early 1980s.  
 
6.8.2 Bilateral Partners’ Stakes 
As mention earlier, Cameroon is a bilingual country.  This bicultural background has 
opened its doors for a wide rang of bilateral relationships with other nations and groups 
around the world.  Many of these bilateral partners are donors who are also involved in 
the forest sector.  These include the Caisse Française de Développement (CFD), the 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), the United States Agency for International Development/Central African 
Regional Program for the Environment (USAID-CARPE), and the British Department 
For International Development (DFID).  The stakes of these bilateral partners vary 
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depending on the degree of involvement of each of them.  With the French as the former 
colonial masters, and with the high number of French logging companies in the country 
together with its political influence, the French cooperation is a major influential partner.  
This French domination of the forest sector is not unconnected to the “secret agreements” 
(DeLancey and Mokeba 1990, 179) signed between the government of Cameroon and 
France on the eve of independence. 
 
6.8.3 Civil Societies’ Stakes
The civil society is represented by National Non-Governmental Organizations and 
International Non-Governmental Organizations.  Prominent International Non-
Governmental Organizations with activities at all levels of the civil society are the World 
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the Global Forest Watch (GFW), and the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN).  These organizations work mostly in 
collaboration with multilateral partners like the Food and Agricultural Organization 
(FAO), International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), and United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP) hence, limiting their stakes with the forest sector.  Even 
though the involvement of International Non-Governmental Organizations is not direct, 
their contribution (through the “boomerang effect” – the use of middleman to achieve an 
objective) to the development of forest policies that sees into the needs of the civil 
society is indispensable.  For example, International Non-Governmental Organizations 
have worked with the government of Cameroon to initiate and sponsor key projects to 
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investigate causes and consequences of forest loss and land cover change, and to propose 
policy changes to try and remedy the situation.  Some prominent projects include:  
• The Campo-Ma’an Forest Project aimed at conserving biodiversity and promoting 
rational and sustainable use of natural resources and economic development of the 
Campo-Ma’an zone in the extreme southwest of Cameroon; 
• Tropenbos Cameroon Programme (TCP) which focuses on the possibility of 
involving local communities in the process of agreeing on boundaries and uses of 
forest land;  and  
• Mount Cameroon Project (MCP) aimed at improving livelihoods, good governance, 
increase local capacity for forest and land management, and biodiversity 
conservation. 
On the other hand, National Non-Governmental Organizations have been “mushrooming” 
around the country ever since the 1992 Rio Conference on Sustainable development.  A 
majority of these National Non-Governmental Organizations do not have the capacity 
and force capable of influencing major forest policies in the country.  But, that not 
withstanding, their close collaboration with local groups and International Non-
Governmental Organizations creates a “boomerang effect” for the local forest users that 
has resulted in some limited stakes.  
 
Last but not the least in this category of civil societies’ stakes is the local population.  A 
majority of people living in the southern region of the country derive their livelihood 
directly from the forest.  Their main stake is in the non timber forest products (e.g. bush 
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meat) and the conversion of land for agriculture.  The local population is also sensitive to 
the Pettit cash income derived from forest activities like the selling of charcoal and 
firewood to urban dwellers.  
 
6.8.4 Logging Companies’ Stakes
The stakes of logging companies in Cameroon can not be over emphasized.  It entails 
securing their access to the country’s forests with little or no regulation and at the least 
cost possible.  Logging companies will, therefore, do everything to down play any policy 
options that stand in their way.   
 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
 
Due to a series of motivations and driving forces that are interlinked, it is not easy to give 
a concise reason as to why there is forest loss in Cameroon.  Even though analysis of the 
Buea/Limbe and Bertoua case studies reveals that agriculturalists, loggers, and 
urban/rural developers are among the direct agents of deforestation, a proper 
understanding of the deforestation processes requires a deeper explanation of interlinked 
driving forces behind these agents.  Environmental economic literature indicates that 
those who are engaged in deforestation are not properly informed of the environmental 
value of forest.  They either lack incentives to keep them from engaging in illegal and 
unsustainable logging or receive incentives from other sectors of the economy which 
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indirectly promotes illegal and unsustainable logging (Pearce and Warford 1993).  Lack 
of, or over incentives, is a direct outcome of economic failures.   
 
The success of any economy depends on how well the local markets operate and on the 
policies guiding its economic operations (Panayotou 1990).  A failure in the workings of 
the economic system of a country can therefore be attributed (but not limited) to market 
and policy failures.  When a market economy does not function properly, prices of goods 
and services generated by such an economy do not reflect the true social cost and benefits 
from resources used.  This is misleading, especially to the layman who has little or no 
understanding of long term benefit/cost analysis and tend to be myopic in the use of 
resources.  Policy failures are often due to attempts by governments to correct market 
failures (Panayotou 1990).  For example, a common reaction to market failures by most 
governments is to improve their macro economic management portfolios, especially 
output targets.  This strategy does not always turn out well for the forest sector whose 
interconnected ecological functions operate in a micro setting and accounts for more than 
50 per cent of most forest products (Panayotou 1990).  Macro economic management 
policies often disregard traditional land rights.  When traditional land rights are taken 
away from the people, they are forced to use resources illegally, treating them as 
“common property,” with no long term sustainable plan in mind (Hardin 2000).  Any 
attempts, therefore, prevent forest loss and macro benefits such as preservation of 
biodiversity, genetic pool and reduction of global warming can not be met because the 
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local population has no incentive to protect a property whose rights have been taken away 
from them.  
 
The correlation of change detection and natural resource policy has shown that the 
government of Cameroon and its policy makers still do not understand how well to 
incorporate environment and development needs in their plans and programs.  The 
government of Cameroon cannot solve the problem of forest loss by simply going after 
direct agents.  Existing literature indicates that the fundamental causes of deforestation 
are indirect agents that influence the actions of those who actually engage in 
deforestation, making them direct agents of deforestation (Deacon 1992; Amsberg 1998).  
Indirect agents are the results of national economic development goals and/or export 
oriented economies driven by international economic conditions.  The Government of 
Cameroon and its policy makers must fully understand the intricacies of forest loss and 
land cover change to national and global environmental change to be able to make 




A PRACTICAL MODEL OF THE PROBLEM OF FOREST LOSS IN 
CAMEROON 
 
So far this study has determined the degree, rate and forces driving forest loss in 
Cameroon.  The study has also demonstrated how past and present policies contributed to 
the problem.  Having identified failed and inadequate policies that led to forest loss in 
Cameroon this study will now proceed in developing/proposing policies to conserve 
Cameroon’s forest.   Before engaging in the policy development process proper, it is 
important to model the problem in a practical way; that is, contacting stakeholders and 
learning about their concerns.  As noted by Smith (2003), one of the fundamental 
principles guiding decision-making in the public setting is the aggregation of individuals’ 
perception on public issues into a collective or unified option.  Therefore, this chapter 
employs ground truthing methodologies for determining individuals’ concerns for forest 
loss and its environmental impacts.  The aim of this practical modeling exercise is to 
derive information from people experiencing actual conditions of forest loss on the 
ground.  This information will be used to form concept maps representing people’s 
concerns about the problem of forest loss in Cameroon.  An aggregate map of different 
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concerned groups will be developed to facilitate the identification of goals, constraints 
and objectives for the development of policies to conserve the forest.   
 
7.1 Selection of Participants 
A survey was conducted with participants representing the local population, the logging 
companies, and the government of Cameroon.  The selection of participants was based on 
their geographic location in the country (southwest and eastern provinces) and on their 
knowledge and involvement in forest and agricultural activities.   
 
The snowballing technique (used to access hidden population i.e. information from one 
participant reveals a potential participant) was applied so as to interview participants with 
different perspectives on the problem.  It was not possible to gain direct contact with 
representatives of multilateral and bilateral partners, as well as those of Non-
Governmental Organizations; but a thorough search of archival and internet resources 
provided substantial information on the concerns of these partners and the role they play 
in Cameroon’s forest sector.  The survey (Appendix III) was based on the following list 
of important framework components of the problem: 
• Agricultural expansion 
• Logging 
• Road construction 
• Oil extraction 
• Desertification 
• Soil degradation 
• Low flow of rivers and streams 
• Silting of streams and rivers 
• Slash and burn farming 
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• Agribusiness 
• Loss of biodiversity 
• Loss of cultural identity 
• Un-priced forest goods and services 
• Wrong incentives 
• Logging Concessions 
• Concentration of landownership 
• Weak or non-existing ownership and land tenure arrangement 
• Illegal activities and corruption 
• Population growth and pressure 
• Excessive (foreign) consumption 
 
7.2 Concept Mapping 
 
What follows on the next couple of pages is a series of concept maps that emerged out of 
the list of important framework components of the problem.  Each concept map is 
accompanied by a text box explaining the survey instrument above.  These maps have 
been developed by grouping the thoughts of the participants according to their perception 
on the totality of the environment, agricultural expansion, access to the forest, and 
government policies and practices.  From personal judgment, this researcher has also 
indicated on each concept map where his concerns fit.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems.  Participants’ 
level of concern with each issue is indicated with the letters H = High, M = Medium, and 
L = Low.  The final map (figure 7.5) is an aggregate of the concept maps. 
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H = High level of concern     M = Medium level of concern     L = Low level of concern 
 
The box “Sees Self Here” indicates were researcher’s concern fits.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems. 
 
Figure 7.1: Concept map showing one group’s focus on environmental concerns 





















Sees Self Here 
Cameroon’s forests have numerous 
environmental functions that are vital 
for the support system on which 
Cameroonians depend.  Participants of 
this group show a degree of concern 
over the role of forest in regulating 
local climates, enabling the continuous 
flow of streams and rivers, soil 
stabilization, supply of nutrients, and a 
reservoir for biological diversity. 
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H = High level of concern     M = Medium level of concern     L = Low level of concern 
 
The box “Sees Self Here” indicates were researcher’s concern fits.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems. 
 
Figure 7.2: Concept map of a group concerned with logging and agricultural 
expansion 
 




























In this group, concerns are being 
expressed over the rate of logging and 
agricultural expansion.  Notably is 
indiscriminate logging activities, agric 
expansion on forest land, as well as the 
shifting cultivating habits of the local 
population.  
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H = High level of concern     M = Medium level of concern     L = Low level of concern 
 
The box “Sees Self Here” indicates were researcher’s concern fits.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems. 
 
Figure 7.3: Concept map of a group concerned with access to the forest 
 






Weak Existence of     













Participants of this group are concerned 
that development projects including road 
construction and oil pipe lines have made 
the forest more accessible for harvesting.  
Oil extraction and road construction 
projects also pave way for interference 
with the cultural identity of the indigenous 
forest duelers.   
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H = High level of concern     M = Medium level of concern     L = Low level of concern 
 
The box “Sees Self Here” indicates were researcher’s concern fits.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems. 
 




Goods and Services 
 
L




Weak Existing Land 
















Participants of this group expressed concerns 
over external influences and government 
weaknesses including wrong incentives, too many 
logging concessions, and under-priced goods and 
service.  Weak existing land ownership and land 
tenure arrangements have left the local 
population with the perception that the forest is a 
common property.  This has led to “tragedy of 
the common” as logging becomes indiscriminate 
and uncontrolled. 
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H = High level of concern     M = Medium level of concern     L = Low level of concern 
The box “Sees Self Here” indicates were researcher’s concern fits.  This is because the researcher is a 
Cameroonian and therefore has a stake in the country’s forest problems. 
 
Figure 7.5: Aggregate map derived from the integration of individual concept maps 
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Sees Self Here 
No single factor has contributed to the 
loss of forest in Cameroon.  A series of 
interconnected factors, direct and 
indirect, are responsible for the loss.  
Direct or indirect, government policies 
and practices have affected the 
nation’s forest the most.   
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7.3 Survey Results 
Of the 40 individuals contacted, 32 participated in the survey.  The results of the survey 
indicate that the problem is largely embedded in the complexities of the political, 
economic, and social set up in the country.  As expected, agricultural expansion, 
population growth and pressure, illegal activities and corruption were among issues over 
which participants expressed the most concern.  Analysis of questionnaire responses 
showed that 97% of respondents think there is agricultural expansion in the forest region 
of Cameroon.  This supports the results of the change detection analysis which also 
identified an increase in agricultural field as the most significant change on the landscape.  
Eighty four per cent (84%) of respondents acknowledged that population growth and 
pressure is causing encroachment on forest lands.  This is also in line with the outcome of 
the multivariate regression analysis which showed that a decrease in forest land is 
associated with an increase in rural population (R² = 0.9892).   
 
Although correlation between forest loss and illegal activities and corruption was not 
tested in the regression analysis, 94% of participants in the survey acknowledged that 
illegal activities on the part of the local population, as well as corruption in the 
government of Cameroon and among forest officials in particular, is costing the nation its 
forest resource.  Surprising results in the survey came from the question on land 
ownership and the issue of under-priced forest goods and services.  Only 47% of 
participants think Cameroon’s forest goods and services are under-priced.  The reason for 
this could be lack of public information on the sales of timber and other forest products.  
Again, it is difficult for ordinary Cameroonians to think that forest products, and timber 
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in particular, are under-priced because when they see the high rate at which the forest is 
exploited (daily movement of trucks carrying timber) they conclude that it must be of 
high market value; otherwise exploiters would have stopped exploitation.  Also, only 
51% of participants acknowledged that weak land ownership in Cameroon has led to 
forest loss.  The reason could be that local people do not acknowledge the government of 
Cameroon as custodian of the land since many people have fraudulently obtained a land 
certificate on public lands and now claim it as theirs (Fomété 2001).  A complete result of 
the survey is shown on table 7.1 below: 
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Desertification 26 6 81% High 
Soil degradation 21 11 66% Medium 
Low flow of rivers 17 15 53% Low 
Silting of streams* 17 13 57% Low 
Loss of Biodiversity 18 14 56% Low 
TOTAL 99 59 63% Medium 
CONCERNS FOR LOGGING AND AGRICULTURAL EXPANSION 
Agricultural expansion 31 1 97% High  
Uncontrolled logging** 21 9 70% Medium 
Slash and burn 
farming** 
27 3 90% High 
Agribusiness* 25 6 83% High 
Illegal activities and 
corruption* 
29 2 94% High 
Excessive 
consumption* 
23 8 74% Medium 
TOTAL 156 56 74% Medium 
CONCERNS FOR ACCESS TO THE FOREST 
Road construction 17 15 53% Low 
Oil extraction 19 13 59% Low 
Loss of cultural 
identity* 
20 11 65% Medium 
Weak land ownership 
and land tenure 
arrangements*** 
15 14 52% Low 
Population growth and 
pressure* 
26 5 84% High 
TOTAL 97 58 63% Medium 
CONCERNS FOR GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND PRACTICES 
Under priced forest 
goods and services** 
14 16 47% Low 
Wrong incentives*** 17 12 59% Low 
Too many logging**** 
concessions 
19 9 68% Medium 
Concentration of land 
ownership** 
15 15 50% Low 
Weak land ownership 
and land tenure 
arrangements*** 
15 14 52% Low 
TOTAL 80 66 55% Low 
* = Number of null responses (i.e. number of participants that gave no response to the question). 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has given a practical view of people’s perceptions to the problems of forest 
loss in Cameroon.  Four categories of concerns were examined.  Of these four categories, 
three (logging and agricultural expansion, access to the forest, and environmental 
concerns) showed a medium level of concern to the problem of forest loss in the country 
while one category (government policies and practices) indicated a low level of concern. 
From these results, one can conclude that, though Cameroonians are aware of the 
problems of forest loss in the country, it remains a non salient issue as none of these 
categories is of high level concern to the people.  Cameroonians care about their 
environment but have greater concern for their immediate survival than to the survival of 
the environment.  This attitude of the Cameroonian people towards the environment may 
sounds logical, but it ignores the rationale that their very survival depends on a healthy 
forest which is critical for ensuring long-term food security.  The people’s low concern 
for government policies and practices can be attributed to lack of trust and credibility of 
the government.  This is because the Cameroonian people are not given enough 
opportunity to participate in policy making processes.  Although the problem of forest 
loss is generally not salient among the Cameroonian people, the practical analysis 
performed in this chapter could generate greater concern as the results complement the 
outcome of the space-base and socio economic analysis in chapter 5.  Analyses in the last 





DEVELOPMENT OF POLICIES TO CONSERVE THE FOREST 
 
This chapter draws from the analysis of the last three chapters to develop policies that 
will help conserve Cameroon’s forest.  The task of this chapter is to identify policy goals, 
constraints, and objectives, and to select method(s) for identifying policy options.  Policy 
options were developed by employing the following activities: 
1. Predicting the possible outcomes of each policy option if it were to be 
implemented. Possible outcomes of each policy option were predicted by 
analyzing the influence diagram (figure 6.1) and carrying out simple 
qualitative and quantitative analysis to justify the predicted outcomes.  For 
example, a partial equilibrium analysis was carried out to make assumptions 
on marginal valuations such as marginal social cost (MSC), marginal social 
benefit (MSB) and marginal private cost (MPC) in timber exploitation.   
2. Each predicted outcome was related to at least one of seven evaluation criteria 
in table 8.1. 
3. A policy options and objectives valuation matrix (table 8.2) was used to 
display objectives, evaluation criteria, and policy options. 
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4. The predicted outcomes were rated against the objectives.  This task was 
performed to assess how well each policy’s anticipated performance meets the 
objectives, as measured by evaluation criteria. 
5. The predicted overall performance of each policy option was compared 
against each other.  
 
8.1 Identification of Goals, Constraints, and Objectives 
 
This study has identified shortcomings linked to deforestation and forest loss in 
Cameroon.  Not all the shortcomings are unwanted.  Some shortcomings may be 
necessary to redress other issues that may be of better socio-economic standing for the 
Cameroonian people.  For example, the benefits of improving the wellbeing of the poor 
may be considered against some environmental effects of deforestation.  This leads to 
value conflict.  In defining policy goals therefore, it is important to consider all possible 
conflicting values and to make tradeoffs among alternatives.  The following are 
suggested policy goals to help solve the problem of forest loss in Cameroon: 
 
Stimulate government and private sectors in the direction of socially based objectives by 
reducing externalities 
Inefficient management of Cameroon’s forest resources is partly due to inefficient 
markets.  Too often, the price (P) attached to Cameroon’s forest products are less than the 
market price (marginal cost of production (MC) (Amin 1999)).  When P < MSC it means 
P is not equal to marginal social cost (MSC).  But when P = MSC it means MSC = MC + 
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MEC (marginal external cost).  This means that in order to cover the cost of externalities, 
the marginal cost must reflect the cost of any additional unit of resource consumed.  The 
government of Cameroon does not get the full value of social benefits provided by the 
forest mainly because markets do not consider environmental (externalities) cost; hence, 
offer little or no incentive to protect the forest and the underlying lands.  Externalities 
arise because property rights are not well defined.  Due to the fact that property rights are 
not well defined in Cameroon’s forest, there are “competing claims and conflict” over 
forest lands.   This has led to a scramble for forest resources; hence, mismanagement and 
lack of conservation and proper investment.  If Cameroon’s markets are to function 
efficiently there must be “the existence of well-defined, exclusive, transferable, and 
enforceable property rights over all resources, goods and services” (Panayotou 1993, 35).  
This goal addresses the economic efficiency legitimacy criterion because by reducing 
externalities (through price mechanism and police power), net social welfare can increase 
as policies designed to meet this goal stand a better chance to achieve greater benefits 
than costs.  When benefits in the forest sector are greater than cost, the government of 
Cameroon will stop generating financial subsidy for the sector.  This policy goal 
therefore has the potential of increasing government revenue and putting an end to the 
problem of fiscal deficits.  This goal also requires a utilitarian approach to policy 
analysis; hence, forest resource use becomes more economically efficient.  But this policy 
goal of efficient market operation is not without constraints.  It could be limited by lack 
of well defined property rights, lack of information regarding the value of non-market 
benefit of forest, and lack of available technology.  The objective is to improve market 
functioning and allocation of resources among alternate uses.  Based on research 
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responses and literature from Cameroon, this would be a high level objective due to its 
economic efficiency importance. 
 
• Consider side effects of development and subsidy policies by undertaking reforms that 
would curb the negative incentives of  unsustainable practices  
The Government of Cameroon in the past has unintentionally implemented policies that 
have had negative impacts on the nation’s forest resource.  For example, government 
policies have allowed road projects to take place in forestlands without considering the 
side effects of such projects.  The government thinks only of the security needs of the 
country, without proper assessment of the environmental impacts of these development 
projects.  Also, the government has been giving subsidies to commercial farmers and to 
entrepreneurs in other sectors of the economy who are not directly linked to the forest 
sector.  Such subsidies enable farmers to convert more forestlands to agricultural lands.  
These subsidies also empower timber companies as it lengthens their concession period.  
The government has been very myopic in its approach to these policies.  The government 
needs to adopt an approach that considers the long term effects of its policies.  This 
policy goal of considering side effects of development and subsidy policies addresses 
three substantive policy legitimacy criteria: technical practicability, administrative 
implementability, and political feasibility.  Constraints to this policy goal include 
pressure from powerful elites and political groups to serve their own interest, complying 
with the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment program conditions, and 
limited administrative resources.  The objectives are to restrict development projects from 
forestland and to reduce subsidies granted to forest sector operators and entrepreneurs in 
113
other sectors related to the forest to within a limit that would not encourage more forest 
conversion.  Based on research responses and literature from Cameroon, these would be 
medium level objectives because they do not directly address economic efficiency. 
 
• Eliminate forest tax evasion and enforce proper and regular payment of rents 
Tchoungui et al. (1995, 103) point to the fact that, despite intensive exploitation of 
Cameroon’s forest and despite the forestry tax reforms of the 1994 forestry law, “the 
average annual revenue from forest exploitation in the south is only 800 million franc 
CFA (US$ 1.66million).”  The tax evaluation system in the forest sector is inefficient.  
The current tax code was not properly designed.  This has given the opportunity for 
operators in the sector to evade taxes and rents.  The tax code also contains “loopholes” 
that enable officials to siphon revenues to private accounts.  This goal is oriented towards 
market efficiency and accountability.  Thus, it addresses economic efficiency and 
administrative implementability policy legitimacy criteria.  This policy goal could be 
constrained by expensive and burdensome instruments of control, lack of trained forest 
personnel, and lack of proper feedback of government action.  The objective is to 
strengthen forest tax regulations to cover any “loopholes” and to impose and enforce 
regulations.  Based on research responses and literature from Cameroon, this would be a 
medium level objective as administrative weakness is the main issue here. 
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• Encourage efficient management of the forest sector by limiting the number of 
institutions involved in the sector and increasing coordination amongst them 
The management of the forest sector in Cameroon is the responsibility of a number of 
government ministries and agencies.  Although the Ministry of the Environment and 
Forest is the main ministry responsible for designing and implementing forest policies, its 
activities are often directed and coordinated from the Prime Ministers Office and the 
Presidency of the Republic.  With many institutions involved, coordination of activities 
becomes very difficult as bureaucracy, politics, personal interest, and governance issues 
become inherent in the entire forest sector.  This goal aims at improving coordination 
among institutions responsible for managing the forest sector. Thus, it addresses 
economic efficiency, administrative implementability, and stakeholder acceptability 
policy legitimacy criteria.  This goal of management efficiency could be limited by too 
many institutions involved in this sector, and by entanglements between politics, personal 
interest and governance.  The objective is to reduce high level bureaucracy to within 
levels necessary for the efficient functioning of the sector.  Based on research responses 
and literature from Cameroon, this would be a high level objective. 
 
• Make efficient the  Implementation of the Structural Adjustment Plan (SAP) program 
by adopting an integrated management approach 
Structural Adjustment Plan programs are not designed by the government.  These are 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank programs imposed on indebted nations and 
nations that want to continue borrowing from these multilateral institutions.  Structural 
Adjustment Plan programs in Cameroon have led to job losses and high dependence on 
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forest revenues to repay International Monetary Fund and World Bank debts.  Although 
Structural Adjustment Plan programs prove to have negative socio-economic and 
environmental effects in Cameroon, these programs could also have tremendous positive 
effects if implemented in an integrated manner with maximum coordination with other 
sectors of the national and international economies.  This goal addresses economic 
efficiency, administrative implementability, and stakeholder acceptability policy 
legitimacy criteria.  Dependence on timber export for repayment of International 
Monetary Funds and World Bank loans could constrain this policy goal.  The objective is 
to stimulate the economy, create employment, and sustain income growth so as to reduce 
over dependence on the country’s forests.  Based on research responses and literature 
from Cameroon, this would be a medium level objective. 
 
• Efficient income distribution and prices 
Forest depletion has been linked to population growth as an increase population has 
increased the demand for land to cultivate and fuel wood for energy.  Also, the increase 
in population has led to cheap labor and generated high profits for agribusiness owners, 
making them more viable and having the desire for more land to expand their business.  
An increase in population also implies more mouths to feed; hence, expansion in 
agribusiness to meet the food demands of the population.  Population increase also leads 
to poverty as too may people turn to depend on few individuals.  Increased poverty has 
caused many families to depend totally on the forest for survival, through logging and 
slash-and-burn farming.  Although forest loss is associated with population increase, the 
underlying cause here is income inequality.  This goal of achieving efficient income 
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distribution and prices could close the income gap between the different classes; hence, 
reducing poverty and dependence on the forest by the poor and unemployed.  This goal 
addresses economic efficiency policy legitimacy criteria.  Lack of proper information on 
population and employment structure might limit the performance of this policy goal.  
The objective is to reduce poverty to a level that families can sustain themselves without, 
by necessity, turning to the forest for livelihood.  Based on research responses and 
literature from Cameroon, this would be a high level objective. 
 
8.2 Selection of Evaluation Methods 
 
The raison d’être of conducting analysis in a priori public policy analysis is to assess the 
potential influence of different policy options (Focht 2005).  This is usually done by 
predicting potential obstacles or constraints that may reduce the performance of a policy 
goal or hinder it from performing altogether.  The analysis also considers a set of 
objectives that policy goals work towards attainment.  This analysis will rank policy 
options according to how likely they are to meet the policy objectives.  Three analytic 
methods can be used to evaluate policy options: Benefit/Cost Analysis, Cost 
Effectiveness Analysis, and Multi-Goal Analysis (Focht 2005).   The use of any of these 
methods is influenced by its ability to consider policy legitimacies.  
 
Benefit/cost analysis compares the positive economic values and the negative social 
values that might be generated as a result of a policy alternative.  Therefore, maximizing 
efficiency legitimacy is the essence of performing benefit/cost analysis.  The problem of 
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forest loss in Cameroon is not limited to inefficiency alone hence this method is not the 
best for this analysis.  Cost effectiveness analysis is based on maximizing efficiency 
together with either a practicability or implementability legitimacy criterion.  This is a 
more dynamic method than the benefit/cost analysis method because it maximizes a 
combination of efficiency and one other policy legitimacy criterion.  Although it is a 
better method, it is still not the best for this analysis.  The multi-goal analysis method 
maximizes the combination of all policy legitimacy criteria.  This approach supports 
“positive and post-positive” analyses.  Due to the fact that most public analysis is 
dominated by consideration of economic efficiency, this method favors policy options 
that are likely to produce the greatest net economic benefit (Focht 2005).  A combination 
of all legitimacies (technical practicability, administrative implementability, political 
feasibility, economic efficiency, and stakeholder acceptability) is likely to produce the 
greatest net economic benefits.  The multi-goal analysis method was employed in this 
analysis because it considers all seven policy goals identified earlier and involves all five 
policy legitimacy criteria hence, the greatest potential of producing net economic benefits 
in the forest sector of Cameroon.  
 
8.3 Definition of Evaluation Criteria 
 
This section identifies and explains different evaluation criteria used in comparing policy 
options.  The policy criteria suggested are based on a general assessment of each criterion 
with respect to the problem of forest loss in Cameroon.  The following policy criteria are 
suggested for further discussion and benefit cost analysis: 
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• Market prices must reflect the true social cost and resource use 
This criterion is derived from the goal constraint of lack of information regarding the 
value of non-market benefit of forest.  The criterion raises awareness of the value of the 
forest and the important role it plays in the wellbeing of the people.  This evaluation 
criterion addresses all five legitimacy criteria - economic efficiency, technical 
practicability, administrative implementability, political feasibility, and stakeholder 
acceptability.  This evaluation criterion is anticipated to meet the following objectives: 
1. Improve market functioning and allocation of resources among alternate uses. 
2. Restrict development projects from forestlands. 
3. Strengthen forest tax regulations to cover any “loopholes” and to impose and 
enforce regulations. 
4. Reduce subsidies granted to forest sector operators and entrepreneurs in other 
sectors related to forest to within a limit that would not encourage more forest 
conversion. 
5. Reduce poverty to a level that families can sustain themselves without 
necessary turning to the forest for livelihood. 
 
• Reduce timber export to a sustainable limit within the shortest possible time frame 
This criterion is derived from dependence on timber export for repayment of International 
Monetary Fund loans.  This criterion indicates that the current rate of timber export is not 
sustainable.  This criterion will force the government to adopt better sustainable forest 
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policy alternatives and to exploit other sectors of the economy.  This evaluation criterion 
addresses economic efficiency, administrative implementation, and stakeholder 
acceptability legitimacy criteria.  This evaluation criterion is anticipated to meet the 
following objectives:  
1. Stimulate the economy, create employment, and sustain income growth. 
2. Reduce subsidies granted to forest sector operators and entrepreneurs in other 
sectors related to forest to within a limit that would not encourage more forest 
conversion. 
 
• The government  must set a limit to the number of new roads  occupying  forest lands 
This criterion is derived from constraint that elites and political heavy weights might 
push for road projects in their constituencies for personal motives such as trying to 
guarantee their reelection into office.  This criterion will force developers to consider 
alternative routes and design options that will minimize deforestation.  This criterion 
addresses technical practicability, administrative implementability, and political 
feasibility legitimacy criteria.  This criterion will meet one objective: 
Restrict development projects from forestlands. 
 
• Reduce current forest concessions to within a sustainable limit  
This criterion will resolves the policy constraint of dependence on timber export for 
repayment of foreign debts.  This criterion addresses technical practicability, 
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administrative implementability, and political feasibility legitimacy criteria.  This 
criterion will meet the following objectives: 
1. Reduce subsidies granted to forest sector operators and entrepreneurs in other 
sectors related to forest to within a limit that would not encourage more forest 
conversion. 
2. Strengthen forest tax regulations to cover any “loopholes” and to impose and 
enforce regulations. 
 
• The activities of timber companies must be monitored and evaluated by the 
government and not by the companies themselves  
This is a qualitative criterion that is based on policy goal constraints of burdensome and 
expensive instruments of control and lack of proper feedback of government actions.  It 
addresses economic efficiency and administrative implementability legitimacy criteria.  
This criterion will meet the following objectives:  
1. Strengthen forest tax regulations to cover any “loopholes” and to impose and 
enforce regulations. 
2. Improve market functioning and allocation of resources among alternate uses. 
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• Management decisions must rely more on expert opinion not political opinion 
This is also a qualitative criterion with no specific target.  This criterion is base on policy 
goal constraints of too many institutions involved in managing the forest sector and 
entanglements between politics, personal interest and governance.  This criterion 
addresses economic efficiency, administrative implementability, and stakeholder 
acceptability policy legitimacy criteria.  This criterion will meet one objective: 
Reduce high level bureaucracy to within levels necessary for the efficient 
functioning of the sector. 
 
• The income gap between high and low income earners must reduce annually at a 
reasonable  rate 
This criterion is derived from the policy goal constraint of lack of proper information on 
population and employment structure.  The criterion addresses economic efficiency 
policy legitimacy criterion.  The criterion will meet one objective: 
Reduce poverty to a level that families can sustain themselves without having to 
turn to the forest for livelihood. 
Table 8.1 below is a summary of goals, constraints, objectives, and performance targets 
while table 8.2 is a valuation matrix for policy options and objectives.  The matrix shows 
how well each selected policy option meets policy objectives.  
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TABLE 8.1: GOALS, CONSTRAINTS, OBJECTIVES, AND PERFORMANCE 
TARGETS 
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TABLE 8.2 Cont. 
Outcome Valuations 
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8.4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on analysis and evaluation of policy options as demonstrated by the above matrix 
(Table 8.2), the policy option of “reducing externalities” exhibits the best performance 
(rank # 1).  This policy option meets all five legitimacy criteria: economic efficiency, 
technical practicability, administrative implementability, political feasibility, and 
stakeholder acceptability.  The policy also addresses most (six) of the policy objectives.  
By reducing externalities through price mechanism and police power, markets can 
function well and can lead to efficient allocation of resources among alternative uses over 
time.  This can also enable the economy to attain its optimum potential of human welfare.  
The fact that the other five policy options were not included in the final performance 
evaluation matrix does not mean that they are not to be considered when making policy 
changes.  It simply means that they have constraints that are more difficult to deal with 
than the other two options.  All seven policy options have to be considered but the five 
that did not go through the goal-constraint evaluation will have to undergo intense 
deliberations during the policy adoption stage.  That may require some tradeoffs.  The 
“no action alternative” is included in the final performance evaluation because it is a 







This study has shown how colonial and domestic policy failures have led to the loss of 
Cameroon’s forest cover.  As indicated by analysis in this study, market failure, policy 
failure, institutional weakness, debt crises, and population growth are issues that 
intricately work together to produce the negative outcome that is being witnessed in the 
forest sector of Cameroon.  In other words, the problem is a result of a complex 
combination of socio-economic and political failures on the part of the government as 
well as the general public. These failures are mainly due to disagreements or 
discrepancies between the different actors in the forest sector.  Some major stakeholders 
in the forest sector tend to disagree with or down play certain regulations.  For example, 
underlying causative factors (indirect factors) that are mostly related to poverty are being 
overlooked by the government and instead concentrate on factors (direct factors) that 
only exist because of the underlying factors.  The government must recognize that 
dealing with a single source cannot entirely do away with the problem of forest loss in 
Cameroon.  Both direct and indirect causes must be dealt with equally since they are 
intricately connected.  As identified by this study, one way of dealing with both direct
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and indirect causes is to stimulate government and private sectors in the direction of 
socially based objectives.  This will reduce the income inequality gap that has forced the 
poor to ravage the forest in order to survive.   
 
The tri-factor methodology used in this study identified the need to “reduce externalities” 
as the best policy option of dealing with the problem of forest loss in Cameroon.  The 
only ways of implementing this policy is through “price mechanism” and “police power.”  
This is because externalities have been identified with market inefficiencies and lack of 
well-defined property rights over forest resources.  But these instruments are likely to be 
constrained by external influences.  For example, due to the political influence of the 
French in Cameroon, their timber companies (have the largest share of concessions) often 
benefit from their government’s influence by suppressing policies that threaten their 
interest.  The government and people of Cameroon must understand that France has not 
changed its colonial exploitative policies towards Cameroon, and will do every thing to 
monopolize rights to access the country’s forest and other natural resources.  The 
government of Cameroon must not allow companies from any single country to dominate 
the forest sector as this weakens the government’s ability to set or negotiate prices.  This 
could be a difficult stance against the French as their monopolistic behavior is not 
unrelated to a set of “entangling agreements” between their government and government 
of Cameroon (secret agreements) prior to the latter’s independence in 1961.  These 
“secret agreements” provided France with “an absolute advantage in the conduct of the 
affaires of the new republic of Cameroun” (DeLancey and Mokeba 1990, 179).  
However, this is not to say that the policy option of “reducing externalities” together with 
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other policy options proposed by this study is not attainable.  As a sovereign nation, the 
government and people of Cameroon can use democratic avenues to exercise their 
sovereignty and annul these so called “secret agreements” and other unscrupulous 
agreements with other nations, companies, and individuals’ that have turned Cameroon 
into their “milking cow.”    
 
The political atmosphere in Cameroon is another major constraint to efficient forest 
conservation policies.  Cameroon has been undergoing socio-political changes in the past 
sixteen years, changing from a one party to a multi-party system.  This has created much 
discrepancy between personnel from opposition parties and those from the ruling party.  
These personnel end up fighting for their personal interest and that of their political 
lineage rather than for national and environmental interest.  In such an atmosphere, it is 
important that procedural policy legitimacy take its full course as “the people’s power” 
has the ability to create a common ground (win-win outcome) on which the different 
actors can work, not only for their partisan and personal interest, but for the interest of all 
Cameroonians and their environment.  Such common ground lies in understanding the 
socio-political and economic changes that occur in the country and in the world at large, 
and matching the changes with policies that meet the needs of the people without 
necessarily having a negative impact on the forest in particular and the environment in 
general.  
 
A lasting solution to the problem of forest loss in Cameroon depends on involvement of 
every stakeholder in the development and implementation of policies to conserve the 
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forest, commitment from all stakeholders, efficient institutional capacity, and willingness 
of stakeholders to accept opportunity cost.  For these conditions to be met, Cameroon’s 
fundamental problem of poverty must be addressed first.  This is because as this study 
indicates, poverty and forest loss are mutually related.  As noted by Forestry Outlook for 
Africa (FOSA 2003, 80), “addressing poverty is critical to environmental protection, and 
protecting the environment is crucial for addressing poverty through sustainable 
production of goods and services.”  Addressing the problem of poverty in Cameroon is 
indispensable for reversing the current trend of forest loss since a majority of the poor 
depend on forest resources for their livelihoods.   This will require more research on 
informal sector activities such as collection and trade of fuel wood, encroachment on 
forest lands, and illegal trade of timber and other forest products.   A better understanding 
of these activities will lead to investments that can improve and integrate “illegal” 
activities into the formal economy.  
 
By analyzing landsat imageries, detecting forest cover changes, correlating the changes 
with socio-economic activities and natural resource policies, and using ground truthing 
information to develop new policies, this research makes an original contribution to body 
of knowledge.   This dissertation is only one of many forest research issues in Cameroon.   
Other forest related areas that require more research include forest plantations.  At the 
moment, forest plantations account for less than 1 percent of the total forest area in 
Cameroon.  More research needs to be carried out in order to determine the possibility of 
expanding forest plantations which could be a vital compensation for the loss of natural 
forests.  Another important area requiring scholarly attention is researching the 
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possibilities for non-wood forest products becoming an important source of income and 
employment.  Also, greater attention must be given to the declining capacity of the public 
sector institutions and the increasing role civil society organizations are playing in the 
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APPENDIX I
CHANGE DETECTION DATA FROM POST CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS
Table A.1.1. Pixel analysis of land use cover change in the Limbe/Buea and Bertous Regions
BER84_Z1 BER84_Z2 BER84_Z3 BER84_Z4 BER00_Z1 BER00_Z2 BER00_Z3 BER00_Z4 BUE86_Z5 BUE86_Z6 BUE00_Z5 BUE00_Z6
AGRIG_1 16203 27345 12417 12921 26431 26329 2507 6256 15297 1356 6127 2442
AGRIC_2 17453 20312 19573 21034 17900 26096 15818 29105 12338 3219 28023 2274
FOREST_1 27683 26252 11221 23437 29226 24183 35857 16252 9869 7617 11847 2295
FOREST_2 56312 29702 29786 8985 47910 30501 21251 13450 10164 11078 981 15486
WATER 1497 1322 1931 1196 4972 2424 2509 1690 5651 1593 9133 626
URB/RUR 16267 10819 8292 2879 8976 6219 5278 3699 8655 2559 5870 3983
BERTOUA REGION
ZONE 1 135415 121.8735 ZONE 2 115752 104 ZONE 3 83220 74.898
Agric = 33656 44331 Agric = 47657 52425 Agric = 31990 18325
Increase in Agric = 10675 9.6075 Increase in Agric = 4768 4.29 Decrease in Agric = 13665 12.2985
Forest = 83995 77136 Forest = 55954 54684 Forest = 41007 57108
Decrease in Forest = 6859 6.1731 Decrease in Forest = 1270 1.14 Increase in Forest = 16101 14.4909
Water = 1497 4972 Water = 1322 2424 Water = 1931 2509
Increase in Water = 3475 3.1275 Increase in Water = 1102 0.99 Increase in Water = 578 0.5202
Urb/Rur = 16267 8976 Urb/Rur = 10819 6219 Urb/Rur = 8292 5278
Increase in Urb/Rur = 7291 6.5619 Decrease in Urb/Rur = 4600 4.14 Decrease in Urb/Rur = 3014 2.7126
BUEA REGION
ZONE 4 70452 63.4068 ZONE 5 61974 55.8 ZONE 6 27422 24.6798
Agric = 33955 35361 Agric = 27635 34150 Agric = 4575 4716
Increase in Agric = 1406 1.2654 Increase in Agric = 6515 5.86 Increase in Agric = 141 0.1269
Forest = 32422 29702 Forest = 20033 12828 Forest = 18695 17781
Decrease in Forest = 2720 2.448 Decrease in Forest = 7205 6.48 Decrease in Forest = 914 0.8226
Water = 1196 1690 Water = 5651 9133 Water = 1593 626
Increase in Water = 494 0.4446 Increase in Water = 3482 3.13 Decrease in Water = 967 0.8703
Urb/Rur = 2879 3699 Urb/Rur = 8655 5870 Urb/Rur = 2559 3983
Increase in Urb/Rur = 820 0.738 Decrease in Urb/Rur = 2785 2.51 Increase in Urb/Rur = 1424 1.2816
Table A.1.1 shows the six zones of the two study areas with their different land-use cover classes. The pixels are entered under their respective
zones and dates of acquisations. For example, BER84_Z1 stands for; Bertoua 1984 image scene zone 1 while AGRIC_1 represents the class;
Agricultural Field_1…etc.
The spatial resolution for LANDSAT TM and ETM+ sensors used in the change detection mission is 30m x 30m. This resolution was converted Km²







MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
The SAS System 
 
The REG Procedure 
 Model: MODEL1 
 Dependent Variable: AGRI AGRI 
 
Number of Observations Read           6 
 Number of Observations Used           6 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Sum of           Mean 
 Source                   DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                     2       83.68253       41.84127       4.53    0.1241 
 Error                     3       27.71787        9.23929 
 Corrected Total           5      111.40040 
 
Root MSE              3.03962    R-Square     0.7512 
 Dependent Mean        5.57000    Adj R-Sq     0.5853 
 Coeff Var            54.57127 
 
The SAS System 
 
The REG Procedure 
 Model: MODEL1 




Parameter       Standard 
 Variable     Label        DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept    Intercept     1      -38.50945       24.18634      -1.59      0.2096 
 RURPOP       RURPOP        1        5.61323        2.41493       2.32      0.1027 
 AGOUTPUT     AGOUTPUT      1        0.44088        0.26787       1.65      0.1983 
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The REG Procedure 
 Model: MODEL1 
 Dependent Variable: FOR FOR 
 
Number of Observations Read           6 
 Number of Observations Used           6 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Sum of           Mean 
 Source                   DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                     2      130.71744       65.35872     136.90    0.0011 
 Error                     3        1.43229        0.47743 
 Corrected Total           5      132.14973 
 
Root MSE              0.69096    R-Square     0.9892 
 Dependent Mean        5.25667    Adj R-Sq     0.9819 
 Coeff Var            13.14452 
 
The SAS System 
 
The REG Procedure 
 Model: MODEL1 




Parameter       Standard 
 Variable     Label        DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept    Intercept     1     -195.85451       35.25623      -5.56      0.0115 
 RURPOP       RURPOP        1        5.45751        0.54896       9.94      0.0022 
 INCPER       INCPER        1        0.33662        0.06089       5.53      0.0117 
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The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: WATER WATER 
 
Number of Observations Read           6 
Number of Observations Used           6 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Sum of           Mean 
 Source                   DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                     1        2.18860        2.18860       1.50    0.2877 
 Error                     4        5.83288        1.45822 
 Corrected Total           5        8.02148 
 
Root MSE              1.20757    R-Square     0.2728 
 Dependent Mean        1.51167    Adj R-Sq     0.0911 
 Coeff Var            79.88321 
 
The SAS System 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 




Parameter       Standard 
 Variable     Label        DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept    Intercept     1      -20.25732       17.77597      -1.14      0.3181 
 INCPER       INCPER        1        0.03901        0.03184       1.23      0.2877 
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The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 
Dependent Variable: URBRUR URBRUR 
 
Number of Observations Read           6 
Number of Observations Used           6 
 
Analysis of Variance 
 
Sum of           Mean 
 Source                   DF        Squares         Square    F Value    Pr > F 
 
Model                     1        3.91842        3.91842       0.85    0.4094 
 Error                     4       18.49911        4.62478 
 Corrected Total           5       22.41753 
 
Root MSE              2.15053    R-Square     0.1748 
 Dependent Mean        2.98667    Adj R-Sq    -0.0315 
 Coeff Var            72.00434 
 
The SAS System 
 
The REG Procedure 
Model: MODEL1 




Parameter       Standard 
 Variable     Label        DF       Estimate          Error    t Value    Pr > |t| 
 
Intercept    Intercept     1        1.51138        1.82746       0.83      0.4547 




A Closed Survey on Important Frames of Forest Problems in Cameroon 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Please say/tick Yes or No to the following list of important frames of forest 
problems in Cameroon. 
 
• Do you think there is agricultural expansion in southern Cameroon? YES___ NO___   
• Do you agree that there is uncontrolled logging of Cameroon’s forest? YES___ NO___ 
• Is road construction contributing to loss of Cameroon’s forest? YES___ NO___ 
• Have oil extraction and the pipeline project diminished Cameroon’s forest? YES___ NO___ 
• Is Cameroon suffering from desertification? YES___ NO___ 
• Are there serious soil degradation problems in Cameroon? YES___ NO___  
• Is low flow of rivers and streams a problem in Cameroon? YES___ NO___ 
• Do you silting of streams and rivers in Cameroon due to forest loss? YES___NO___   
• Is slash and burn farming a common practice in Cameroon? YES___NO___  
• Is the expansion of agribusiness contributing to forest loss in Cameroon? YES___NO___  
• Is Cameroon losing its biological diversity because of uncontrolled logging? YES___NO___ 
• Are people in the forest region losing their cultural identity due to forest loss? YES___NO___ 
• Are Cameroon’s forest goods and services well priced? YES___NO___ 
• Are wrong incentives in the forestry and in other sectors to blame for forest loss? YES___NO 
• Are there too many logging Concessions in Cameroon? YES___NO___ 
• Has concentration of landownership led to forest loss? YES___NO___ 
• Has weak or non-existing ownership and land tenure led to forest loss? YES___NO___ 
• Have illegal activities and corruption led to forest loss? YES___NO___  
• Is population growth and pressure causing encroachment on forest lands? YES___NO___ 
• Is excessive foreign consumption causing agricultural land expansion? YES___NO___  
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